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This outline deals almost exclusively with issues
which have arisen in the western United States, with par-
ticular emphasis on Colorado.
II. Physical Classifications of Ground Water.
A. The early cases developed an artificial distinction
between percolating ground water and water which
flows in underground streams, and applied different
doctrines to the two classes of water. The distinc-
tion does not comport with physical reality. It is
more realistic physically to think of water as either
tributary or non-tributary to surface streams.
B. Tributary ground water is water which is hydrauli-
cally connected in some way to a surface stream, so
that withdrawals of ground water may have an impact
upon surface flows. Cf. 1973 C.R.S. 37-92-103(11).
The waters in an unconsolidated alluvial aquifer are
tributary, but waters found in bedrock fractures or
deep aquifers may also be tributary if hydraulically
connected to a surface stream.
C. Strictly speaking, non-tributary ground water is
water which is not hydraulically connected to any
surface stream. Truly non-tributary ground water, in
this geological sense, is rare, since even deep
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water-bearing strata usually outcrop somewhere and
either discharge to or receive recharge from surface
flows. Therefore, we frequently are speaking of
water with a minimal hydraulic connection to surface
streams. The effect of withdrawing such water would
not be evident at a surface stream, if at all, for a
very long time and perhaps at a great distance.
Typically the rate of recharge to this type of
aquifer is limited and the water in the formation has
accumulated over a very long time. However, the
pressure relationships within a confined aquifer
(where water is under pressure within a formation
between confining strata) may transmit effects more
quickly and over greater distance than within an
unconfined or water table aquifer.
III. Legal Classifications of Ground Water.
In Colorado, ground waters may fall into four legal
categories which cut in part across physical classifications.
A. Ground water may be tributary in a legal as well as
in a physical sense. In Colorado, the presumption,
in the absence of strong countervailing evidence, is
that all ground waters are tributary. Safranek v. 
Limon, 228 P.2d 975 (1951).
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B. Water may be tributary in a geological sense, but the
effect upon a surface stream of withdrawing that
water so attenuated that it is regarded as being
tributary only to a de minimis extent. This water is
treated legally as if it were non-tributary. See
Kuiper v. Lundahl, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328
(1974). For ground water to fall within this cate-
gory the time of effect upon stream flows from
pumping a well (which may be different from and
considerably less than the time for a particular
molecule of water to travel through the aquifer to a
surface stream) is long, such as 100 years. See
District 10 Water Users Ass'n. v. Barnett, 599 P.2d
894 (1979). Where the time of effect is between 40
and 100 years, the courts have not decided how to
treat the water. Compare Lundvall, supra, with Hall
v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973).
C. Non-tributary water is that which is either geologi-
cally non-tributary or which is legally non-tributary
because geologically tributary only in a de minimis
sense.
D. "Designated ground water" may include either geologi-
cally tributary or non-tributary water. It is
defined as water within the boundaries of a desig-
nated ground water basin (which may be based upon
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geographical as well as geological considerations)
and either (1) geologically non-tributary, or
(2) "ground water in areas not adjacent to a continu-
ously flowing natural stream wherein ground water
withdrawals have constituted the principal water
usage for at least 15 years...." 1973 C.R.S.	 37-
90-103(6).
IV. Legal Regimes for Allocating Rights to Tributary Ground 
Water.
A. Doctrines.
1.	 Controversies among tributary ground water 
users. Such a situation could arise, for
example, where two or more wells are in close
proximity, and the pumping of one interferes
with the physical supply for the others.
a. Some states apply the same laws as would be
applicable to surface water; others have
separate bodies of law for ground water and
surface water. See the discussion at page
458 of Trelease, Water Law, Third Edition.
b. Priority of appropriation may govern or a
modified priority doctrine may apply. For
example, in Colorado, it has been held that
the senior ground water appropriator must
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have a reasonably efficient means of
diversion. The senior may not call out
juniors and deny their use of the aquifer,
in order to effect an inefficient diver-
sion. However, the cost of providing the
senior with facilities which will permit
both him and the juniors to divert may fall
upon the juniors. Colorado Springs v. 
Bender, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
2.	 Controversies between users of tributary ground 
water and surface water users. Since tributary
ground water, by definition, contributes to the
surface supply, pumping will have an effect upon
surface supplies. However, the amount of water
in the alluvial aquifer and the surface stream
together likely will exceed the water available
from the surface stream alone. Therefore, the
question is how to make full use of the water
resource without impairing the senior rights of
surface users.
a.	 No action is one alternative. For more
than 30 years, Colorado allowed the drill-
ing of wells in the alluviums of its major
surface streams. One result was a substan-
tial well-based economy. However, another
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result was sharp controversy when senior
surface diversions declined, partly because
of the effect of the wells.
b. In 1965, the Colorado legislature adopted
H.B. 1066, which basically directed the
State Engineer to administer tributary
ground waters in the same manner as he
administered surface water rights, i.e. in
accordance with their respective priori-
ties. See C.R.S. 	 148-11-22 (1965 Supp.),
subsequently repealed.
c. This approach was rejected by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Fellhauer v. People, 167
Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968). The Court
reasoned that maximum utilization was as
much of an imperative, to be found impli-
citly in the Constitution, as the protec-
tion of vested senior rights, which is
based expressly upon the language of the
Constitution.
B. Legal tools for accomplishing conjunctive use.
Colorado has experimented with a variety of means of
implementing the twin Fellhauer mandates.
1.	 Restrictions upon the issuance of new permits.
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a. All new wells have required permits since
1957. However, Colorado's standards for
permit issuance have become increasingly
strict. Now, no new permit will be issued
for a non-exempt well outside of a designa-
ted basin unless the State Engineer "finds
that there is unappropriated water avail-
able for withdrawal by the proposed well
gand that the vested water rights of others
will not be materially injured, and can be
substantiated by hydrological and geologi-
cal facts...." 1973 C.R.S. S 37-90-137.
See Attachment A.
b. This statutory standard has been applied
stringently. In Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo.
130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973), the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
permits for two wells to be located 13
miles from the nearest major stream, even
though there would have been no impact upon
surface flows for approximately 40 years.
2.	 Protection of existing ground water use.
a.	 When the Colorado Legislature rewrote the
water laws in 1979, it created an exemption
for small (50 g.p.m. or less) existing
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wells used for various defined purposes,
including irrigation of up to one acre of
home gardens and lawns. See 1973 C.R.S.
S 37-92-602. The Legislature obviously
could have chosen to exempt existing large-
capacity wells, but it did not. It did
create an exemption for very small (15
g.p.m. or less) wells used for household
and other limited purposes, but the more
recent trend has been to make these exemp-
tions much narrower.
b.	 Administratively also, the State has
experimented with provisions which would
protect existing pumping. The first set of
rules and regulations adopted by the State
Engineer to integrate ground water and
surface water use utilized a zone approach
under which wells close to the South Platte
River were required to be curtailed for a
longer period than wells at a greater
distance. This approach was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Ruiper v. Well Owners, 176
Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971). However,
since 1971, the State Engineer has elected
to pursue tougher rules and regulations
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which would curtail existing pumping after
a several year grace period unless the
wells were sheltered by the priority of a
senior surface right. This approach has
met with only limited success, resulting in
a stipulation in the South Platte drainage
basin and a judicial determination that the
State Engineer may not make his previous
rules more stringent in the Arkansas River
basin without proof of the inadequacy of
the prior rules. Kuiper v. Atcheson, T. 
and S. F. Ry. Co., 195 Colo. 557, 581 P.2d
293 (1978).
c.	 There is an unresolved issue within desig-
nated ground water basins. The Legislature
contemplated that administration of ground
water uses would be handled by local
management districts under the general
supervision of the State Ground Water
Commission, rather than by the State
Engineer as part of his general administra-
tive duties. However, the statute is
silent as to what happens if ground water
pumping within such a basin affects surface
rights, either inside or outside of the
boundaries of the basin.
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3. Requirements that surface users make full use of 
all facilities available to them, including 
wells, before junior wells are curtailed. This
position was argued to the Supreme Court in
Kuiper v. Well Owners, supra, but the Court
found that no such requirement existed in the
1969 statute or otherwise. A recent trial court
decision, arising out of the challenge to the
State Engineer's proposed rules and regulations
for the basin of the Rio Grande reached a
different result. In that case, which now is on
appeal, the Water Judge ruled that the owners of
senior surface rights must attempt to supply
their decrees through the use of wells, includ-
ing new wells, prior to requiring the curtail-
ment of junior well appropriators. Judgment, In 
the Matter of Rules and Regulations Governing 
the Use, Control and Protection of Water Rights 
for Both Surface and Underground Water Located 
in the Rio Grande and Conejos River Basins and 
Their Tributaries, January 31, 1980. See
Attachment B.
4. Reliance upon private sector creativity. The
private sector has had some success in integra-
ting surface and ground water usage, allowing
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the use of ground water while protecting the
rights of senior appropriators. The 1969 Act
authorized the develoment and adjudication of
"plans for augmentation," i.e. flexible programs
to protect senior appropriators, through the
provision of substitute supplies of water or
otherwise. See 1973 C.R.S. S 37-92-103(9).
These plans frequently have been utilized by
real estate developers, municipalities and
energy companies to provide a legally secure
supply for new wells, although augmentation
plans also have been utilized by irrigators and
others to protect existing diversions. A well
operating under the protection of such a plan
enjoys freedom from administrative curtail-
ment. The concept was challeneged, but upheld,
in the parallel Supreme Court cases of Kelly 
Ranch v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy 
Dist., 191 Colo. 65, 550 P.2d 297 (1976) and
Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier 
View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d 288 (1976).
5.	 Public water management programs.
a.	 Colorado has not moved too agressively in
this direction, although proposals are made
from time to time for the creation or
Gil
public financing of a river basin authority
which might manage the total water resource
and determine when wells should be used
rather than surface rights and vice
versa. Cf. 1973 C.R.S. S 7-93-101-108.
b.	 Water conservancy districts do have autho-
rity to develop plans for augmentation, and
some have done so. See 1973 C.R.S. S 37-
92-302(5).
V.	 Legal Regimes for Allocating Rights to Non-tributary 
Ground Water.
A. Controversies.
1. Competition among users of non-tributary ground 
water. The Court or administrative agency must
determine how, and to what extent, to protect
existing uses and to what extent to permit new
uses.
2. The "mining" issue. The situation often is
complicated by the fact that the amount of water
within the aquifer may be relatively large, but
the rate of annual recharge relatively small.
Should the rate of withdrawal be limited to the
rate of recharge, so as to preserve the ground
water for future generations, or should this
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water be permitted to be developed over some
finite time period? Is the answer any different
where existing uses already exceed the annual
recharge? Some states have chosen to preclude
mining of ground water. See, for example, Baker
v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d
627 (1973). Other states, such as Colorado,
have chosen to permit mining of the ground water
on some basis or another.
B. Legal doctrines based on land ownership.
1. The English or common law rule was that the
surface owner owned the underlying water and
could take it, so long as he did not do so
maliciously or wastefully, despite the impact
upon his neighbor.
2. The so-called American rule of reasonable use 
limits the right of the overlying landowner to
the amount of water which is necessary for
beneficial use on the land from which it is
taken.
3. The doctrine of correlative use limits the
rights of overlying landowners by providing that
when there is inadequate supply for all, they
must prorate.
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4.	 The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts the
correlative rights doctrine, but adds the
provision that the overlying landowner's with-
drawal of ground water may not unreasonably harm
a neighbor, through lowering the water table or
reducing artesian pressure, without potential
liability.
C. Legal doctrines independent of land ownership.
1. Some states apply the doctrine of prior appro-
priation. Statutes which do this have been
upheld against the constitutional challenge that
they deprive the landowner of property. See,
for example, State v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225
P.2d 1007 (1950), and Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D.
517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964). The prior appropri-
ation doctrine may not always provide a workable
answer, however, since the impact of one well
upon another is largely a function of their
respective locations.
2. A number of states have adopted modified appro-
priation systems for the apportionment of ground
water. See Wyo. Stat. 1957 Section 41-132,
providing for apportionment by priority unless
this will not result in proportionate benefits
to senior appropriators, in which case the State
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Engineer may require a system of rotation of
use.
3.	 Colorado has adopted a modified prior appropria-
tion system for designated ground water 
basins. Prior appropriators are entitled to
protection, but this does not include the
maintenance of historical water levels. 1973
C.R.S. S 37-90-102. Prior appropriators are
protected in part through the process for
permitting new wells, which are allowed only if
the proposed appropriation would not unreason-
ably impair existing water rights. 1973 C.R.S.
37-90-107(4). The Ground Water Commission has
developed a test under which it draws a circle
with a 3-mile radius around a proposed well
site, determines a rate of pumping which would
permit a 40% depletion of the available ground
water over 25 years and then determines whether
that rate of pumping is already being
exceeded. The test has been approved by the
Colorado Supreme Court in Fundingsland v. Ground 
Water Commission, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835
(1970), but reviewed more critically in sub-
sequent cases. See Thompson v. Ground Water 
Commission, 194 Colo. 489, 575 P.2d 372 (1978);
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Peterson v. Ground WAter Commission, 195 Colo.
508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978); Berens v. Ground Water 
Commission, 614 P.2d 352 (1980).
	
4.	 The California Supreme Court created another
means of allocating water among ground water
users. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 207
P.2d 17 (1949), held that the various users of
the Raymond Basin had established mutually 
prescriptive rights as against each other and
must share proportionately in a reduction of the
amount to be pumped. However, the impact of the
Pasadena case was limited substantially by the
subsequent decision of Los Angeles v. San 
Fernando, 14 Ca1.3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975),
holding that a prescriptive right could not be
asserted against a municipality and could not be
asserted against any other party unless that
party had adequate notice that a condition of
overdraft existed.
D. Colorado experience with non-designated, non-tribu-
tary ground water.
	
1.	 Prior to 1973, Colorado had no statute dealing
explicitly with non-tributary ground water
outside of designated basins. The 1965 Ground
Water Management Act contained a provision, Sec.
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140-18-36, requiring a permit for all new wells
outside of designated groundwater basins. See
Attachment A for that section as amended.
2. The applicable case law was Whitten v. Coit, 153
Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963), and Colorado 
Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458 (1961).
Whitten v. Coit held that the adjudication
statute which applied to surface waters did not
apply to non-tributary groundwaters. However,
in dictum, the court approved language from a
law review article to the effect that a land-
owner has a property interest in the non-
tributary water underlying his land, and stating
further that this property right is subject only
to the reasonable use doctrine.
3. In 1973, the Colorado Legislature adopted S.B.
213, now 1973 C.R.S. 37-90-137(4), which is part
of Attachment A. This Section purports to limit
the right to withdraw non-tributary groundwater
to a quantity underlying lands owned by the
applicant or by others, with their consent, and
to ration that withdrawal over 100 years.
However, the statute unfortunately uses language
of appropriation as well as of land ownership,
raising questions as to the underlying doc-
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trine. The statute also speaks in terms of
issuing a permit when there is "no material
injury to vested water rights ....".
4. In December of 1978, various interests filed
claims all over the state for thousands of non-
tributary wells and for over 20 million acre
feet in underground reservoirs. An original
proceeding was commenced in the Colorado Supreme
Court to consolidate these cases in order to
obtain a determination of common questions of
law. The Supreme Court appointed a special
water judge to hear certain fundamental ques-
tions which it identified, including the issue
of the basic doctrine which applies to non-
tributary water outside of designated basins.
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. 
Huston, 197 Colo. 365, 593 P.2d 347 (1979),
Attachment C.
5. On February 11, 1981, M. 0. Shivers, Special
Water Judge, issued his Ruling, Judgment and
Certification, Attachment D. The Special Water
Judge ruled that non-tributary waters are
subject to the doctrine of appropriation, but
that a non-landowner may not effect such an
appropriation without obtaining the right to
C's
utilize the overlying land for the drilling of
wells and related purposes. The Court further
stated that this right is unavailable to private
persons through eminent domain. The Court
proceeded to dismiss each of the applications
before it on various grounds, including the
ground that the uses claimed for the water were
speculative and therefore improper. (See
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566 (1979).)
The Special Water Judge's ruling is being
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
6.	 In another significant case under S.B. 213, the
developers of the large Mission Viejo project
applied for permits to Withdraw water from the
non-tributary Arapahoe Formation underlying
lands owned by them. The State Engineer denied
the permits on the ground that other water
rights in the vicinity, drawing upon the same
aquifer, would be injured because of the loss of
artesian pressure and decline in the water
table. The Water Judge for Division No. I
ordered that the permits be issued under S.B.
213. See Attachment E. He ruled that the
acceleration of water level declines which would
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be caused by the new wells did not constitute
"material injury" under the statute, relying
upon Whitten v. Coit and Colorado Springs v. 
Bender, both supra. He noted that water levels
would continue to decline because of the pumping
of other existing wells in any event, and held
that the developers should not be compelled to
forego the development of non-tributary ground-
waters underlying their lands for the benefit of
others who tapped the same aquifer. This
decision was not appealed.
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ATTACHMENT A
and notice shall also fix the date upon which such election shall
be held, the manner of holding the same, and the method of voting
for or against the incurring of the proposed indebtedness. Such
election shall be held in the same general manner as in this article
provided for the election of directors. The bond issue or indebt-
edness proposed shall not be valid unless a majority of those voting
at the election held for that purpose vote in favor of such bond issue
or indebtedness in. accordance with the terms of the resolution.
37-90-135. Management district - dissolution - procedure - funds -
disposition.-- If there are no debts outstanding, the board of
directors may, on its own motion or on the written petition of
twenty percent of the taxpaying electors of the district, request
of the ground water commission that the question of dissolution of
such district be submitted to the electors of the district. The
commission shall fix the date of such election, notice of which
shall be given and whicn shall be conducted in the same manner as
elections for the formation of such districts. If a majority of
those voting on such question vote in favor of dissolution, the
commission shall so certify to the county clerk and recorders of
the counties involved and the district shall thereupon be dissolved.
The question of dissolution shall not be submitted more often than
once every twelve months. In case a district is dissolved the funds
on hand or to be collected shall be held by the treasurer, and the
directors shall petition the district court of the county in which
the main office is located for an order approving the distribution
of funds to the taxpayers of the district on the same basis as
collected.
37-90-136. Unlawful to divert water for application outside of
state.-- For the purpose of aiding and preserving unto the state
of Colorado and all its citizens the use of all ground waters of
this state, whether tributary or nontributary to a natural stream,
which waters are necessary for the health and prosperity of all the
citizens of the state of Colorado, and for the growth, maintenance,
and general welfare of tne state, it is unlawful for any person to
divert, carry, or transport by ditches, canals, pipelines, conduits,
or any other manner any of the ground waters of this state, as
said waters are in this section defined, into any other state for
use therein.
37-90-137. Permits to construct wells outside designated areas -
fees - permit no ground water right - evidence - time limitation.--
(1) From and after May 17, 1965, no new wells shall be constructed
outside the boundaries of a designated ground water basin, nor the
supply of water from existing wells outside the boundaries of a
designated ground water basin increased or extended, unless the user
makes an application in writing to the state engineer for a "permit
to construct a well", in a form to be prescribed by the state
engineer. The applicant shall specify the particular designated
aquifer from which the water is to be diverted, the beneficial use
to which it is proposed to apply such water, the location of the
proposed well, the name of the owner of the land on which such well
will be located, the average annual amount of water applied for in





per minute, and, if the proposed use is irrigation, a description
of the land to be irrigated and the name of the owner thereof,
together with such other reasonable information as the state engineer
may designate on the form prescribed.
(2) Upon receipt of an application for a replacement well or a
new, increased, or additional supply of ground water from an area
outside the boundaries of a designated ground water basin, accompanied
by a filing fee of twenty-five dollars, the state engineer shall
make a determination as to whether or not the exercise of the request-
ed permit will materially injure the vested water rights of others.
If the state engineer finds that there is unappropriated water
available for withdrawal by the proposed well and that the vested
water rights of others will not be materially injured, and can be
substantiated by hydrological and geological facts, he shall issue
a permit to construct a well, but not otherwise; except that no
permit shall be issued unless the location of the proposed well will
be at a distance of more than six hundred feet from an existing
well, but if the state engineer, after a hearing, finds that cir-
cumstances in a particular instance so warrant, he may issue a permit
without regard to the above limitation. The permit shall set forth
such conditions for drilling, casino, and equipping wells and other
diversion facilities as are reasonably necessary to prevent waste,
pollution, or material injury to existing rights. The state engineer
shall endorse upon the application the date of its recei p t, file and
preserve such application, and make a record of such receipt and the
issuance of the permit in his office so indexed as to be useful in
determining the extent of the uses made from various ground water
sources.
(3) (a) Any permit to construct a well, issued on or after
April 21, 1967, shall expire one year after the issuance thereof,
unless the applicant to whom such permit was issued shall furnish
to the state engineer, prior to such expiration, evidence that
the water from such well has been put to beneficial use, or unless
prior to such expiration the state engineer, upon application, with
good cause shown, as to why the well has not been completed and an
estimate of the time necessary to complete the well, extends such
permit for only one additional period certain, not to exceed one
year, but the limitation on the extension of well permits provided
for in this paragraph (a) shall not apply to well permits for feder-
ally authorized water projects contained in paragraph (d) of this
subsection (3). The state engineer shall charge a reasonable fee for
such extension.
(b) Any permit to construct a well issued by the state
engineer prior to April 21, 1967, shall expire on July 1, 1973,
unless the applicant furnishes to the state engineer, prior to
July 1, 1973, evidence that the water from such well has been put
to beneficial use prior to that date. The state engineer shall
give notice by certified or registered mail to all persons to whom
such permits were issued at the address shown on the state engineer's
records, setting forth the p rovisions of this subsection (3). Such
notices shall be mailed not later than December 21, 1971.
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Cc) If evidence that water has been placed to beneficial use
as required pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) has
not been received as of the expiration date of the permit to con-
struct a well, the state engineer shall so notify the applicant by
certified mail. The notice shall give the applicant the opportunity
to submit proof that the water was put to beneficial use prior to the
expiration date, but, due to excusable neglect, inadvertence, or
mistake, the applicant failed to submit the evidence on time. The
proof must be received by the state engineer within twenty days of
receipt of the notice by the applicant and must be accompanied by a
filing fee of thirty dollars. If the proof can be given favorable
consideration by the state engineer, then, within thirty days, a
synopsis of the proof shall be published, specifying that objections
shall be filed within thirty days. After the expiration of the time
for filing objections, if no such objections have been filed, the
state engineer shall, if he finds the proof to be satisfactory, find
that the permit should remain in force and effect. If objections
have been filed together with a nonrefundable filing fee of ten dollars,
the state engineer shall set a date for a hearing on the proof and
the objections thereto and shall notify the applicant and the objectors
of the time and place. The state engineer shall consider all evidence
Presented at the hearing and all other matters set forth in this
section in determining whether the permit should remain in force and
effect.
(d) In the case of federally authorized water projects wherein
well permits are required by this section and have been secured, the
expiration dates thereof may be extended for addittonal periods based
upon a finding of good cause by the state engineer following a review
of any such project at least annually by the state engineer.
(4) In the issuance of a permit to construct a well in those
aquifers which do not meet the definitions of section 37-90-103 (6)
or section 37-92-103 (11), and do not meet the exemptions set forth
in sections 37-90-105 and 37-92-602, the provisions of subsections
(1) and (2) of this section shall apply, except that, in considering
whether the permit shall be issued, only that quantity of water under-
lying the land owned by the applicant or by the owners of the area,
by their consent, to be served is considered to be unappropriated;
the minimum useful life of the aquifer is one hundred years.
5479	 I-206a
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assuming that there is no substantial artificial recharge within
said period; and no material injury to vested water rights would
result from the issuance of said permit. The state engineer may
adopt rules and regulations to assist in, but not as a prerequisite
to, the granting or denial of permits to construct wells and for
the administration of this underground water.
37-90-138. Waste - well logs - license - bond - violations -
penalties.--
(1) The state engineer in cooperation with the commission has
power to regulate the drilling and construction of all wells in
the state of Colorado to the extent necessary to prevent the waste
of water and the injury to or destruction of other water resources,
and shall require well drillers and private drillers to file a log
of each well drilled whether or not exempt by virtue of section
37-90-105. The state engineer shall adopt such rules and regulations
as are necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section.
(2) If the state engineer finds any well to have been drilled
or maintained in a manner or condition contrary to any of the pro-
visions of this article or the regulations issued under this
article, he shall immediately notify the user in writing of such
violation and give him such time as may reasonably be necessary,
not to exceed sixty days, to correct deficiencies. If the user
rails or refuses to make the changes within the allowed tithe, the
state engineer is authorized to enter upon his land and do whatever
is necessary in order that the user comply with the provisions of this
article or regulations issued under this article.
(3) No well driller or private driller shall drill a new well or
otherwise do work on any well requiring authority from the state
engineer until a permit with respect thereto has been secured for
such work. Any structure which would fall into the classification
of a "well" as defined in section 37-90-103 (21), except for the
fact that the same is made for the purpose of a test only, shall be
completely filled within thrity days after completion of the test,
and if not so filled shall be deemed a "well" as defined in said
subsection (21).
37-90-139. Existing beneficial uses not recorded - fee.--
Existing uses of ground water put to beneficial use prior to May
17, 1965, not of record in the office of the state engineer on April
21, 1967, may be recorded upon written application and payment of
a filing fee of twenty-five dollars, and shall retain the date of
initiation when first put to beneficial use, but no such recording
shall be accepted after December 31, 1968.
37-90-140. Inclusion of lands.--
(1) (a) The boundaries of any district organized under the
provisions of this article may be changed in the manner prescribed
in this section, out the change of boundaries of the district shall
not impair or affect its organization or its rights in or to pro-
perty, or any of its rights and privileges whatsoever; nor shall it
affect or impair or discharge any contract, obligation, lien, or





IN THE DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR WATER DIVISION NO. 3
STATE OF COLORADO
Case No. W-3466
IN THE MATTER OF RULES AND 	 )
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE	 )
USE, CONTROL, AND PROTECTION	 )
OF WATER RIGHTS FOR BOTH 	 )
SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND	 )
WATER LOCATED IN THE RIO	 )
GRANDE AND CONEJOS RIVER 	 )
BASINS AND THEIR TRIBUTARIES. )
JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER came on for trial commencing March 3, 1979,
and concluding July 24, 1979. The State Engineer, Proponent
of the Proposed Rules, was represented by David W. Robbins
and Donald H. Hamburg, Special Assistant Attorneys General,
for the Attorney General of Colorado. Protestants Oliver
Gould and Faye Gould, Kenneth E. Hodgell and Marilyn A. Hodgéll,
Hodgell Farms, Inc., Still Farms, Inc., Ford Farms, Inc.,
John M. Davis and Adalyn M. Davis, Headlee Wright and Harriet
A. Wright, Joseph L. Tonso and James T. Tonso, Joseph H. Camillo
and Grace P. Camillo, and Xlecker Ranch, inc., were 'represented
by William R. Bartlett. Protestants Board of County Commissioners
of Rio Grande County, Colorado, and Otto W. Scherzer and
Margaret Scherzer were represented by Richard L. Sloss, Jr.
Protestants Byron Phillips and Myra Phillips dba South Fork
Lodge, Gary L. Mix and Elizabeth A. Mix, Ray McGee and Ruth
McGee dba Wolf Creek Ranch, Robert T. Davie and Ross Davie,
Harold L. Benson and N. Carolyn Benson, Leo D. Stoeber and
Eva G. Stoeber, John H. Gjellum and Elizabeth Ann Gjellum,
Wayne Armstrong and Lorana Armstrong, Norman W.Slade and Janice
M. Slade, Irene D. Slade, Robert M. Butler individually and
as personal representative of the Estate of Robert W. Butler,
Deceased, Harry Anderson and Ruth Anderson, Greg A. Gosar and
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Suzanne Gosar, James Salters, James G. Cooper dba Water Develop-
ment, Robert J. Shown, Town of Del Norte, Navajo Development
Co., Inc., and M. Willis Blau and Yvonne J. Blau were represented
by Elizabeth A. Concur. Protestants Thelma Wadsworth, Monte
Vista Potato Growers Corporation Association, Walter W. Firkins
and Dorothy M. Firkins, Lester R. Muller and Lois A. Muller,
Reed Hynds, Ward E. Mathias and Bettymae Mathias, B.A.R.Cattle
Company, Cyrus K. Rickel as trustee of Bonnie Ann Rickel Trust,
Cyrus K. Rickel and B. Preston Lockhart of the testamentary
trust of Cyrus R. Rickel, Sr., and Monte Vista Consolidated
School District were represented by Robert S. Crites, Jr.
Protestant The City of Monte Vista was represented by Robert
S. Crites, Jr., and by Michael White of Yegge, Hall and Evans.
Protestant Conejos Water Conservancy District was represented
by William A. Hillhouse II and Joseph P. McMahon of Davis,
Graham and Stubbs; David L. Harrison of Moses, Wittemyer,
Harrison and Woodruff, P.C.; and by Carlos F. Lucero. Protestant
San Luis Valley irrigation Well Owners, inc., was represented by
M. E.. MacDougall of Geddes, MacDougall, Geddes and Paxton, P.C.,
and by George W. Woodard. Protestants Rio Grande Water Users
Association, Billings Ditch Company, Centennial Ditch Company,
Chicago Ditch Company, Castilla Ditch Company, Commonwealth
Irrigation Company, Excelsior Ditch Company, The Grant Ditch,
Independent Ditch Company, Monte Vista Water Users Association,
Rio Grande Canal Water Users Association, Santa Maria Reservoir
Company, San Luis Valley Irrigation District, San Luis Valley
Canal Company, Senior Water Rights Association and Rio Grande
Lariat Ditch Company were represented by John U. Carlson, John
Land and Paul D. Frohart of Holland and Hart. Protestants
Rio Grande and San Luis irrigation Company, Lariat Irrigation
Company and Rio Grande and Piedra Valley Ditch Company were
represented by John U. Carlson, John Land and Paul D. Frohart
of Holland and Hart and by Gordon H. Rowe, Jr. Protestant




Land and Paul D. Frohart of Holland and Hart and by Gordon
H. Rowe, Jr. Protestants Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection
Association, H. E. Ryker, Hugh Hamilton, Stanley Price,
Ivan Gylling, Leonard Hartung, Wade Hartung, Larry Beaudin,
Gordon Reed, Kenneth L. Hensley, John F. Griffee, Leo 0. Price,
Andres Mondragon, Kawanabe Farm, Larry W. Coombs, Seaman Syndicate
Ditch Company, William Gallagher, Tim Gallagher, Carmel Drain
Water Users Association, and Jack Allen were represented by
Monte Pascoe and Kirk Holleyman of Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor
and Holmes, P.C. Protestant Terrace Irrigation Company was
represented by Monte Pascoe and Kirk Holleyman of Ireland,
Stapleton, Pryor and Holmes, P.C. and by George W. Woodard.
Protestants Manassa Land and Irrigation Company, Mogote
Northeastern Consolidated Ditch Company and Romero Irrigation
Company were represented by John McClure of McClure and
Jacobs, P.C. Protestants San Luis Valley Canal Company,
San Luis Valley Ranches, Inc., Larwill-Costilla Ranches, Inc.,
Top of the World Ranches, Inc., San Antonio River Water Users
Assocation and William Gibson were represented by David L.
Harrison of Moses, Wittemyer, Harrison and Woodruff, P.C.
Protestants Robert E. Robbins, Jr., Gary Robbins, David E.
Broyles, Pete DeHerrera, Aniceto Lucero, James Darold Vance
and Beryle J. Vance, Henry Salazar, and Alfonso Abeyta were
represented by David L. Harrison of Moses, Wittemyer, Harrison
and Woodruff, P.C., and by Stephen T. Williamson of Musick,
Williamson, Schwartz, Leavenworth and Cope, P.C. Protestant
The Bowen Drainage District was represented by Gordon H. Rowe,Jr.
PrOtestants Commonwealth Irrigation Company and The Hickory-
Jackson Ditch Company were represented by Charles Alexander of
Seraphine, Bratton, Alexander and Ramous. Protestants AZL
Resources, Inc., and Adolph Coors Company were represented by
W. B. Tourtillott and Christopher Paulson of Saunders, Snyder,
Ross and Dickson, P.C. Protestant The Rio Grande Water Conser-
vation District was represented by Robert. S. Wham of Shoemaker
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and Wham. Protestants The San Luis Valley Drainage District
No. 1 and The waverly Drainage District No. 1 were represented
by Kenneth A. Selby. Protestants Winnie D. Dunn aka Mrs. James
T. Dunn; Mrs. Rae Cliff t; The First National Bank of Lanese,
Lanese., Texas, Trustee under the Will of James T. Dunn, Deceased;
Seamster Farm, Inc.; John P. Seamster, Sr.; Bonnie L. Seamster;
S. Paul Beck; Catherine Beck and John P. Seamster, Jr.; and
Non-Pareil Processing Corporation were represented by John S.
Wilder. Protestants Trinchera Irrigation Company, Trinchera
Water Conservancy District, Cerro Ditch Company, San Pedro Ditch
Company, San. Luis People's Ditch, Costilla County Conservancy
District and Dos Hermanos Ranches, Inc., were represented by
0. John Kuenhold. Protestants Capulin Water and Sanitation
District, Chama Domestic Water Users Association, Inc., Conejos
Water and Sanitation District, Conejos Water and Sewer Association,
Fort Garland Water and Sanitation District, Guadalupe Water
Association, Town of La Jan, San Luis Water and Sanitation
District, Romeo Water and Sanitation District, Town of Manassa,
Town of Blanca, Town of Center and Town of Antonito were
represented by Michael White of Yegge, Hall and Evans. Protestants
City of Alamosa and East Alamosa Water and Sanitation District
were represented by George H. Ottenhoff and Michael White of
Yegge, Hall and Evans. Protestants Carl E. Benson, Arthur
C. Benson and Nina M. Benson, Larry H. Mayfield and D'Anna L.
Mayfield, T. A. Dicky and Amber Dicky, Obbie L. Dicky and
Willa Lee Dicky, Colbert Pepper and Virginia Sue Pepper, Pepper
Farms, Lois Hynds, Deceased, and Reed Hynds individually and
as Adminstrator for Lois Hynds, Deceased, A. L. Wood and
Claudine Wood, Evan Keith Montgomery, Grace I. Montgomery and
Blanche M. Montgomery, Bob 31oxsom, Walter Burkhart and Arlene
Burkhart, Orville E. Stewart, James B. Melchior and Cheryl
Melchior, Frank L. Rodman and Grace A. Rodman, Ray Pauley and
Linda M. Pauley, Keith Scidmore, Irene I. Scidmore, Harold
K. Scidmore and Frances Jean Scidmore, Saguache County Farm
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Bureau, CarlE. Goldbranson, Wade D. Hill and Betty Jane
Hill, Milne Enterprises, Inc., Donald J. moschetti and
Cathryn A. Moschetti, Wayne M. Davis and Wilma Wilcox, sole
and only heir and devisee of Toney Wilcox, Deceased, appeared
pro se.
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, having
heard and reviewed the evidence, having considered the briefs
submitted and having heard the arguments of counsel, finds
that:
On August 21, 1975, the State Engineer promulgated
proposed "Rules and Regulations Governing the Use, Control,
and Protection of Water Rights for Both Surface and Under-
ground Water Located in the Rio Grande and Conejos River
Basins and their Tributaries" (Proposed Rules), under
S 37-92-501, C.R.S. 1973, of the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act of 1969 and S 37-80-104, C.R.S. 1973.
Pursuant to S 37-92-302(3), C.R.S. 1973, appropriate notice
of the Proposed Rules was published in all counties of Water
Division No. 3 in the manner provided for by law. Numerous
protests were filed.
The Honorable Donald G. Smith, Water Judge in this
Court, entered an Order on June 23, 1976, disapproving the
Proposed Rules and remanding the matter to the State Engineer
for the purpose, inter alia, of proceeding separately with the
Rio Grande Compact interpretation issues and the integration of
ground and surface water issues inherent in the regulations.
By decision dated August 21, 1978, Kuiper v. Gould, 	 Colo.
, 583 21 .2d 910 (1978), the Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed, and remanded the action to this Court for further
proceedings, and appointed the undersigned Water Judge to preside.
The Proposed Rules would govern and integrate the State
Engineer's regulation, for intrastate and interstate purposes,
of both surface and underground water in Water Division No. 3,
which is generally coterminous with the San Luis Valley
G29
	 5
(the Valley). The Proposed Rules provide:
a. A method of regulation of the Conejos River
and its tributaries (Conejos) and of the Rio Grande and its
tributaries, exclusive of the Conejos (Rio Grande mainstem)
so as to satisfy the interstate delivery requirements set
forth in the Rio GrandeCompact, C.R.S. 1973 S 37-66-101 et seq.
(Compact), including an allocation of the 10,000 acre feet of
water annual credit•which reduces the total obligation of
Colorado, contained in Article III of the Compact. The basic
mode of administration proposed requires that the Conejos
deliver sufficient water at a gauging station near La Sauses
(the mouth of the Conejos) to satisfy the schedule of deliveries
contained in the table entitled Discharge of Cone-)os River in
Article III of the Compact, and requires that the Rio Grande
mainstem deliver sufficient water at a gauging station near
Lobatos to satisfy the schedule of deliveries contained in
the second table entitled Discharge of the Rio Grande, exclu-
sive of the Cone os, in Article III of the Compact.
S. Restrictions on non-beneficial winter diversions
within the Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem.
c. Provisions concerning storage in pre-Compact
reservoirs.
d. Specification of the times and quantities in which
underground water from aquifers hydraulically connected to
surface streams may be placed to a beneficial use.
e. A schedule of progressive curtailment over a five
year period -- starting with curtailment two days per week
and ending with total curtailment -- of the diversion of
underground water from aquifers hydraulically connected to
surface streams.
f. A list of exceptions to the application of the well
curtailment schedule. The exceptions are based on possible
operation of a well pursuant to a decreedplan of augmentation,




g. A requirement that all artesian wells in Water
Division 3 be equipped with suitable control devices.
The San Luis Valley consists of a broad elevated plain in
south central Colorado. The Valley extends approximately 90
miles from north to south and 50 miles from east to west,
with a "floor" elevation varying from roughly 7,500 feet to
8,000 feet above sea level. The Valley is surrounded by the
San Luis and La Garita Hills, and the Conejos, San Juan,
Saguache, and Sangre de Cristo Mountains with elevations
ranging up to over 14,000 feet. The Valley floor sustains a
highly productive agricultural economy, which is totally
dependent on irrigation water. The principal crops grown
are alfalfa, potatoes, brewing barley, small grains and native
hay.
The Rio Grande mainstem rises in the San Juan Mountains
to the west of the Valley, flows southeasterly through Del
Norte and Monte Vista to Alamosa, then runs generally south
for some 40 miles through a break in the San Luis Hills and
enters New Mexico. The Conejos River rises in the mountains
to the southwest and flows northeasterly along the southern
edge of the Valley, joining the Rio Grande mainstem at
La Sauses. The Conejos River has two principal tributaries,
the Los Pinos and San Antonio Rivers. These streams flow
northerly from New Mexico into Colorado, where they conjoin,
and then discharge into the Conejos River near Manassa. Other
tributaries of the Rio Grande mainstem in Colorado include
La Jara, Alamosa and Rock Creeks from the west, and Trinchera,
Culebra and Costilla Creeks from the east. Costilla Creek, a
tributary of the Rio Grande which flows through New Mexico and
Colorado, is governed by a separate interstate compact and it
is not affected by the Proposed Rules.
The floor of the San Luis Valley is underlain by a
complex ground water system, which is interrelated with the
Valley's surface water in a complicated manner. Unconfined
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of non-artesian water underlies the great bulk of the Valley
floor at shallow depths. Beneath this unconfined aquifer system
there are relatively impermeable beds, consisting principally
of clays, but in some locales consisting of basalts, which
cover a large area of the Valley subsurface. Beneath these
confining layers lie substantial quantities of water under
artesian pressure. This confined aquifer system is recharged
principally from surface inflow to the ground water system
around the Valley's perimeter. The existence of this confined
water results in many wells of an artesian or naturally flowing
nature. There is estimated to be over two billion acre feet
of ground water in storage beneath the San Luis Valley.
There is an hydraulic divide, a ridge in the ground
water table, that extends across the unconfined aquifer,
generally from west to east, a few miles north of the Rio
Grande mainstem. North of this divide is an area commonly
known as the Closed Basin. The lowest surface area of the
Closed Basin, known as "the sump," or "the dead area," lies
in the southeastern portion of the basin, in the vicinity of
the San Luis Lakes. The great bulk of the irrigated acreage
in the Closed Basin lies west of the sump in a relatively
compact block extending northerly from the hydraulic 'divide.
This irrigated land is supplied with water from the Rio Grande
by means of four large mutual irrigation systems, the Rio
Grande Canal, the Farmers Union Canal, the Prairie Ditch, and
the San Luis Canal. Numerous small streams flow into the Closed
Basin and toward the sump. Their discharge does not contribute
to the flow of the Rio Grande, for the water conveyed to the
sump is lost to non-beneficial evapotranspiration. By
Stipulation of the parties hereto and by order of this Court
approving said Stipulation, Rule II (subjecting waters to
administration for Compact purposes) of the Proposed Rules does
not apply to certain unconfined waters within the Closed Basin.
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Irrigation development in the San Luis valley began
in the 1850's and 1860's, primarily on Culebra Creek and
the Conejos River. The most extensive development on both
the Rio Grande and the Conejos occurred in the decade between
1880 and 1890, when even the peak runoff flows of water were
appropriated and substantial canal construction was undertaken.
By 1890, as a result of the irrigation-based agricultural
economy which had developed by that date throughout the San Luis
Valley, the natural flow of all surface streams in the Valley
was over-appropriated. Well construction in the district
began as early as 1850; in fact the most senior water right
in the Valley is a well.
Cue to the pattern of high spring runoff and very low
summer flows in San Luis Valley streams, and the occurrence
of a severe drought cycle in the 1890's, water users in
the Valley very early began to seek reservoir development to
regulate their water supply, and to construct wells to supply
or supplement their water requirements. Early efforts to
obtain reservoir development on the Conejos and Rio Grande
were frustrated by an 1896 embargo instituted by the United
States Secretary of the Interior, which precluded needed
permission to utilize federal lands for construction' purposes.
A later modification enabled some limited reservoir construction,
(Rio Grande Reservoir, Santa Maria Reservoir and Continental
Reservoir on the Rio Grande headwaters), but the embargo
remained largely in effect until 1925.
Following lifting of the embargo in 1925, federal grants
for reservoir construction within Colorado were vigorously
resisted by New Mexico and Texas. They contended that such
development would increase depletions in Colorado and thus
diminish the water supply of the downstream states. In an
effort to resolve their differences, representatives of the
three states met with the goal of fOrmulating an interstate
compact concerning the Rio Grande. These, efforts culminated
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in a compact signed February 12, 1929, (Temporary Compact),
in which the three states promised not to alter existing condi-
tions on the river pending further study and efforts to obtain
federal aid. By its explicit terms, the Temporary Compact
did not effect an equitable apportionment of Rio Grande waters
among the three states, nor establish any precedent regarding
proper long term resolution of the interstate controversy.
Formal negotiations for a permanent compact among the
three states began in December, 1934. Colorado's official
representative at the 1930's negotiations was M. C. Hinderlider,
Compact Commissioner and State Engineer. Hinderlider was
assisted (as were the other parties)by both engineering and
legal advisors. His Engineer-Advisor was Royce J. Tipton.
His legal advisors in drafting the Compact were Ralph L.
Carr, who participated throughout the negotiations on behalf
of water users along the Conejos River, and George M. Corlett,
who similarly participated on behalf of water users along
the mainstem of the Rio Grande. In the final phases of the
negotiations, Judge Clifford Stone of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board also acted as a legal advisor to Hinderlider.
While these negotiations were underway, in Septembe” of 1935
President Franklin D. Roosevelt reinstituted a form Of reservoir
embargo by issuing a mandate that no application directed to
federal agencies for projects involving the use of Rio Grande
water be approved "without securing from the National Resources
Committee a prompt opinion on it from all relevant points of
view." The National Resources Committee was a special federal
agency, constituted by President Roosevelt, with special
responsibilities in the area of the nation's internal development.
This presidential mandate effectively precluded any federal
contribution to further water development projects in Colorado,
or elsewhere on the Rio Grande, and thereby gave impetus to a





At that time there was also pending before the
United States Supreme Court a suit brought by Texas against
New Mexico regarding the respective rights of the two states
to the waters of the river. See Texas v.  New Mexico, 296
U.S. 547 (1935). The burden and risks of this litigation
to the parties, together with the threat that Colorado might
be joined as a defendant, was a further inducement to the three
states and their citizens to compose their differences by
a permanent compact.
Following this presidential mandate the three states
and the federal government,under the auspices of the National
Resources Committee, undertook an extensive study known as
the Rio Grande Joint Investigation "to determine the present
and potential water and land resources of the Rio Grande
Basin." The study and its conclusions confirmed the position
taken by Colorado, that extensive reservoir development was
possible in the San Luis Valley without material injury to the
downstream states.
Following receipt of the completed report of the Rio
Grande Joint Investigation in the Fall of 1937, the states
made rapid progress toward a compact. At meetings of the
Compact Commissioners in September and October, 1937)
sufficient agreement on general principles was reached to
warrant referral of the matter to the Engineer-Advisors.
The essential features of the final Rio Grande Compact,
along with its underlying engineering principles, were
formulated in a report to the Compact Commissioners by the
Engineer-Advisors, dated December 27, 1937. In spite of previous
assertions by the downstream states that there had been early
water development in their regions which constituted "senior"
water rights that should be given preference over allegedly
"junior" rights in Colorado, the Engineer-Advisors stated in
their report that they "avoided discussion of the relative
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rights of water users in the three states, and were guided
throughout our work by the general policy - - expressed at
the meeting of the Compact Commission in October -- that present
uses of water in each of the three states must be protected
in the formulation of a Compact. . . because the usable water
supply is no more than sufficient to satisfy such needs."
Thus, the Engineer-Advisors and the Compact Commissioners
explicitly rejected a Compact based on an interstate priority
system. Instead, they constructed a plan aimed at preserving
established levels of development within each of the river
segments, by limiting allowable stream depletions to those
which had prevailed in each segment during the ten years from
1928 through 1937.
This plan was based on an engineering method called
inflow-outflow analysis. For the years 1928 through 1937,
hereafter referred to as the Compact study period, the
Engineers determined inflow at certain upstream gauging
stations on both the Rio Grande mainstem and the Conejos
and its two tributaries. By comparing the measured inflow
above the principal diversions with outflow below the
principal diversions, the Engineers were able to identify
consistent relationships between Conejos inflow and outflow
at the river's mouth and between Rio Grande mainstem inflow
and outflow. These consistent relationships plotted as smooth
curves on a graph. By reference to these curves the amounts
set forth in the two tables in Article /II were fixed. By
this inflow-outflow method the Engineers sought to tie Colorado's
delivery obligations to the amount of indexed inflow. Thus,
as water supply increased on each stream, the amount of required
outflow increased as well. By reference to the two curves, the
Engineers concluded that with a certain inflow on a stream,
under conditions then prevailing on the rivers, a corresponding
outflow was to be expected. The expected outflows, subject to
minor adjustments, became the delivery obligations.
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The Engineers recognized that departures or variations
from the predicted performance of each river would occur in
future years due to man's activities or to the vagaries of
nature, e.g. the sequencing of wet and dry years, variable
runoff patterns, new depletions. Accordingly, they attempted
to protect Colorado from the obvious difficulties in adherence
to the scheduled deliveries on an annual basis by allowing debits
and credits to accumulate within certain parameters.
A similar inflow-outflow analysis was performed for that
section of New Mexico above Elephant Butte Reservoir. The
Engineers recommended a schedule of deliveries from the Rio
Grande as measured at an upstream gauge in New Mexico, near
Otowi Bridge, and a delivery gauge near San Marcial, New Mexico.
Thus, that portion of the State of New Mexico served by the
Elephant Butte reclamation project and project lands in Texas
above Fort Quitman are guaranteed certain deliveries. It
should be noted that Article IV of the Rio Grande Compact
divides New Mexico into two sections, and lumps the lower
section with Texas as entitled to receive water from both
Colorado and New Mexico above Elephant Butte Reservoir. Thus,
the plan of the Engineers ignored state boundaries and focused
rather on distinct segments of the Rio Grande River.
With relatively minor alterations, the substance of
the Engineers' December 27, 1937, proposal was adopted in
the final Rio Grande Compact.
The Compact was signed on March 18, 1938, codified at
37-66-101, C.R.S. 1973, ratified by the legislatures of
each of the three states involved and given the consent and
approval of the United States Congress by the Act of
May 31, 1939 (53 Stat. 785).
Colorado's obligations to the downstream states are
principally specified in Article III of the Compact. Article
III contains two tables variously denominated in the text as
"tabulations of relationship" or "schedules," which are
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respectively entitled "Discharge of Conejos River' and
"Discharge of Rio Grande Exclusive of Conejos River." Each
table lists quantities of water to be discharged at specified
downstream gauging stations whenever certain quantities of
water pass specified upstream gauging stations. The amount of
discharge required thus fluctuates with the indexed water
supply. "Discharge" means a measurable outflow, the required
magnitude of which is in this instance established for the
Conejos River and the Rio Grande mainstem by the respective
tabulations of relationship.
The Compact does not establish any separate "discharge
tables" or "schedules," nor any corresponding gauging stations,
for any Rio Grande tributary other than the Conejos River
and its tributaries, the Los Pinos and San Antonio.
As disclosed by the Compact proceedings and the directive
of the Commission to the Engineer-Advisors referred to
above, the overriding object sought to be attained in the
equitable apportionment of the Rio Grande was the mainten-
ance of the levels of water use then existing in the various
sections of the Basin. The mechanism utilized for equitable
apportionment consists principally of fixing delivery obli-
gations which preserve a level of water usage by the 'tabulations
of relationship established for the Conejos River and the Rio
Grande mainstem (in Article III), and for the portion of
New Mexico above Elephant Butte Reservoir (in Article IV).
During the entire history of irrigated agriculture in
the San Luis Valley, water rights on the Conejos River have
been administered independently of water rights on the Rio
Grande mainstem. 	 This independence follows from obvious
physical facts. The Conejos and the Rio Grande mainstem join
shortly before the Rio Grande enters the State of New Mexico.
Prior to and at the time of the signing of the Compact, there
were no decreed diversions from the Rio Grande in Colorado




means whereby any water user on the Conejos River could
by a "call" that is, by exercise of a priority right,
obtain delivery of water from, or otherwise impact
diversions on, the Rio Grande mainstem, or vice versa.
The legislative history of the Rio Grande Compact
contains numerous statements demonstrating that the
Compact negotiators and their advisors intended the Com-
pact to be interpreted and applied within Colorado to
continue separate and independent administration of
the Conejos River and the Rio Grande mainstem.
An analysis of the Engineer-Advisors' Report of
December 27, 1937, was prepared by C. L. Patterson,
Chief Engineer of the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
and submitted to the Colorado negotiators in March of
1938. In this analysis Patterson recognized that the
proposal for separate Conejos and Rio Grande "schedules
of deliveries" constituted a form of apportionment of
Colorado's responsibilities as between the two streams.
He noted that the proposal would constitute a volumetric
limitation on the amount of permitted depletion on each
stream, that such volumetric allowance of depletion had
already been reached on the Conejos, and that existing
uses on the Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem within
Colorado would be protected only to the extent that
existing levels of depletions were not expanded.
Beginning in the early 1950's Colorado began to
accumulate what the downstream states denominate a
"debit" or shortfall in Compact deliveries. The total
accumulated alleged debit for Colorado reached nearly
944,000 acre feet by the end of 1967. During this
period the Colorado water officials did not curtail
Colorado direct flow diverters or pre-Compact reservoirs
for purposes of satisfying the Compact.
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In 1966 Texas and New Mexico initiated an original
action against Colorado in the United States Supreme Court,
in which they sought to compel Colorado to repay this
alleged debit, and to adhere to the schedule of deliveries
contained in the Compact.
This suit was stayed in 1968 pursuant to a stipulation
among the three states. In that stipulation the plaintiff
states agreed that so long as Colorado met the deliveries
spelled out by Article III on an annual basis, they would
not press the litigation. Colorado, in return, promised
to undertake appropriate administrative and legal action
to assure annual compliance. Failure by Colorado to adhere
to its undertaking entitled the plaintiff states to resume
the litigation. The allowance for accumulated departures
up to 100,000 acre feet, contained in Article V/ cannot
be invoked during the life of the stay. Hence, it is
necessary for the State Engineer to administer the
Conejos and Rio Grande on the basis of a projected annual
runoff. The uncertainty of what the flow will actually
measure at the end of the year greatly compounds the
administrative problems encountered in complying with
the stay.
In compliance with the terms of the stay, the State
Engineer has, in each year starting with 1958, administered
surface diversions on the Rio Grande with the objective
of assuring deliveries at the state line in accordance
with the second table of Article III, and administered
surface diversions on the Conejos with the objective of
assuring deliveries at La Sauses in accordance with the
first table of Article III.
Since the State Engineer began to administer surface
rights on both the Conejos River and the Rio Grande mainstem
G40
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in an effort to satisfy the two streams' respective Article
III schedules, water users on both streams have experienced
substantial curtailments of their diversions. These
curtailments have reduced substantially the annual volume
of diversions on both streams.
Until 1974 no attempt was made to regulate ground
water withdrawals in the Valley. Then and thereafter
well regulation was accomplished by curtailment of well
production at specific times or under stated conditions.
Various aspects of the hydrological patterns and
system existing in the San Luis Valley at the time the
Compact was consummated have subsequently been altered
by a combination of natural and man-made causes. Approx-
imately seventy to eighty percent of the total annual
surface water runoff in the San Luis Valley results from
melting of the snowpack in the surrounding mountains.
Precipitation on the Valley floor constitutes a relatively
minor proportion of total streamf low. Since the Compact
study period, annual Valley floor precipitation in
both the Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem areas has
remained roughly constant. However, annual snowpackk
supplying both the Conejos River and the Rio Grande
mainstem has declined significantly since the Compact
study period. This general decline commenced circa 1950.
In spite of the decline in snowpack, the relationship
between snowpack and index inflow on both the Conejos and
Rio Grande mainstem has remained generally constant on
each stream since the date of the Compact. This demon-
strates that the decline in water supply as measured at
the upstream index gauges is primarily attributable to
decline in snowpack and not to new man-made depletions
above the Compact index stations. While the sustained
17
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declines in snowpack and hence inflow on the Conejos
River in the post-1950 period have continued to the
present, there has been a recovery in Rio Grande mainstem
snowpack and inflow during the last decade to levels
only slightly below those experienced during the
Compact study period.
Records of the State Engineer indicate that there
has been a decline in diversions in the post-1950 period
along both the Conejos and the Rio Grande, roughly corres-
ponding in volume to the declines in inflow during that
time. Post-Compact depletions in the lower reaches of
the Conejos River have increased over pre-Compact levels
of depletion in part because of the increased use of
return flows in that area, and by increased diversions
from the Conejos into the La Jara watershed. Water
dperted out of the Conejos Basin contributes no return
flow to aid in deliveries at La Sauses.
In an equitable apportionment of an interstate
stream, the State of Colorado has legal power and authority
to allocate by Compact different burdens and entitlements
between various sections of the river. This is especially
true where, as here, the burden represents only that
quantity of water which was not consumed on each river
at the time of the Compact.
The law of equitable apportionment derives from
two sources: judicial decrees which determine respective
rights on an interstate stream [Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U. S. 589 (1945)], and interstate compacts. The former
mechanism comes into operation upon initiation of an original •
action between states before the United States Supreme
Court. The latter mechanism is authorized by the United




created by an agreement between the sovereign states,
consented to by the federal Congress. While the former
is purely a judicial resolution of a controversy, the
latter is the result of negotiation. Its very flexibility
and amenability to provide for peculiar local conditions
has made it a widely used approach, and one urged upon
the states by the United States Supreme Court. [Colorado
V. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383, 392 (1943)].
The utilization of interstate compacts to avoid the
uncertainties and burdens of litigation has been favored
by the State of Colorado. In addition to the Rio Grande
Compact, Colorado has entered into compacts with respect
to waters of Costilla Creek, Las Animas River, La Plata
River, the Colorado River, the Arkansas River, the South
Platte River, and the Republican River. Several interstate
compacts to which Colorado is a party; other than the Rio
Grande Compact, contain provisions that have an impact
upon the intrastate distribution of water within Colorado.
Although an interpretation of the Rio Grande Compact as
establishing separate Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem
delivery obligations merely reinforces historical San Luis
Valley use and administration patterns, other compacts
contain provisions altering historical practice and
modifying the application of the prior appropriation doctrine
within Colorado. The La Plata River Compact, ' 5 37-63-101,
C.R.S. 1973, Article II, Sec. 3, upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Hinderlider v. La Plata, 304
U. S. 92, 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938), the Arkansas
River Compact, 5 37-69-101, C.R.S. 1973, Article V and
the Upper Colorado River Compact, 5 37-62-101, C.R.S.
1973, ARticle XI (a) and Article XIII, each contain
provisions, which, as a part of the specific equitable
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interstate apportionment formulated, in some manner
affect'the distribution of water within Colorado.
Because the controversy about the meaning of the
statute is so intense, because so much is at stake in
this case, and because the litigants assert diametrically
opposing interpretations of the Compact, the Court has
determined that it is appropriate to test its con-
clusions by reference to 5 2-4-203, C.R.S. 1973. That
statute calls for an examination of the following:
a. The Object Sought to be Attained. 	 As expressed
in the legislative history, the object of the Compact
was to eliminate Interstate controversy by effecting an
equitable apportionment which maintained levels of use
then prevailing in all sections of the basin. This is
fully consistent with the view that the separate Conejos
and Rio Grande mainstem discharge schedules contained in
Article III constitute binding obligations. Further,
the United States Supreme Court has held that in applying
the doctrine of equitable apportionment, a Court is called
upon to fashion a judgment which will preserve, to the
greatest degree possible, the development which has •
grown up on a river system. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U. S. 589, 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815 (1945).
b. The Circumstances Under Which the Statute Was
Enacted. The historically separate use and administration
of the Conejos River and the Rio Grande mainstem water
rights which prevailed at the time that the Compact was
entered into reinforce the construction of Article III
as mandating separate delivery obligations. Had the
Compact negotiators intended to establish for the first
time a unitary, valley-wide priority system to satisfy
Colorado's interstate commitments, a radical break from
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the pre-existing circumstances would have been necessitated.
The law is reluctant to impute so fundamental a change
without clear evidence of such a design. There is no
such evidence.
c. The Legislative History, The legislative history
of the Rio Grande Compact contains numerous statements by
Compact principals which are only reasonable, logical and
meaningful when the Compact is construed to create separate
Conejos and Rio Grande delivery obligations.
d. Laws Upon Same or Similar Subjects. To the extent
that the Rio Grande Compact has an impact on the intrastate
distribution of water within Colorado by establishing separate
Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem interstate obligations, other
laws upon similar subjects, namely other interstate compacts
to which Colorado is a part, provide examples which support
such an approach. See Arkansas Compact, 5 37-69-101, Article
V, D; Upper Colorado River Compact, 5 37-62-101, Articles XI
and XIII; La Plata River Compact, S 37-63-101, Article II,
Sec. 3.
3. Consequences of a Particular Construction. Com-
parison of the consequences obtaining from the separate
delivery obligations to those stemming from a unitary oblig-
ation provides, further reinforcement of the view that the
former is intended by the Compact. Separate delivery oblig-
ations will no doubt yield less water to Conejos appropriators
than would a unitary obligation, but they will still obtain
a larger volume of water per acre of irrigated land (as measured
by the Rio Grande Joint Investigation) than do mainstem
appropriators. Also, separate delivery obligations will provide
the more equitable apportionment of the burden of meeting
Compact requirements than would unitary obligation.
f. Administrative Construction. The administrative
construction of the Rio Grande Compact has consistently supported
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the position that separate Conejos River and Rio Grande
mainstem delivery obligations are created thereby. The
construction of a statute by administrative officials charged
with its enforcement is to be given great weight by Colorado
courts.
g. The Declaration of Legislative Purpose. The
declaration of purpose which prefaces the Rio Grande Compact
identified these purposes:
(1) a desire to remove controversy among
the states, and between the citizens
of one state and the others;
(2) a desire to effect an equitable apportion-
ment of the waters.
Here equitable appnrtionment preserved the water supply that
had been historically used in the Conejos area and in the
Rio Grande mainstem area. Had the Rio Grande Compact not
mandated separate delivery obligations for the Conejos River
and the Rio Grande mainstem, Compact administration not
preserving the historically separate use and administration of
the two stream systems would violate S 37-80-104, C.R.S. 1973.
This statute provides that when any compact is deficient in
establishing standards for administration, implementation of
its provisions shall be formulated "so as to restore lawful
use conditions as they were before the effective date of
the compact insofar as possible." In light of the historical
conditions existing at the time of the Compact's enactment,
lawful use conditions in the San Luis Valley would be most
nearly restored by making the Conejos and Rio Grande mainstem
responsible for the deliveries indicated by their respective
discharge tables, which were based on historical conditions
in each area.
The Rio Grande Compact is clear on its face. The only
logical purpose for the two "tabulations of relationship" speci-
fying the "Discharge of Conejos River" and the "Discharge of
Rio Grande Exclusive of Conejos River" is to establish separate
22
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obligations for administration of these two rivers in
Colorado. Perhaps it was unwise for this to have been
done by the Compact. However, this is what it provides
and we are bound thereby.
The consequences of approving separate delivery
obligations for the Conejos River and the Rio Grande
mainstem is to maintain each stream's historically
separate dependence on the particular water supply nature
affords that stream, and to allocate to water users on each
stream the burden of pursuing those responsible for new
depletions in their area: in short, to preserve the his-
torical regime on the two stream systems, which developed
under the prior appropriation doctrine.
The award of 10,000 acre feet credit was intended, as
determined by the Compact itself and its legislative history,
to benefit both streams, and the method of allocation in
Proposed Rule II E is inconsistent with that intent. This
credit was intended as a "cushion" to protect against hard-
ships and inequities caused by variations from predicted
performance of each river due to "vagaries of nature" or
other causes. It shoul,d be applied to relieve such hardship
and inequities when they occur on either river. The'percent-
age allocation tied to each river system's delivery requirement
as provided by Rule II E must be disapproved.
The surface streams, the unconfined aquifer and the
confined aquifer in the San Luis Valley are all hydraulically
connected, but the extent of the connections is not uniform
and has not begn fully defined. The confined aquifer is a
pressure system and water from it leaks upwards through the
confining clay layers into the unconfined aquifer. But, the
transmissivity and thickness of the confining layers varies
from place to place. Thus, the amount of leakage may vary
also in different locations. The unconfined aquifer is
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directly connected with the surface streams in some places
but not in other places.
Both the number of large capacity wells and the amount
of water withdrawn from such wells in the Valley have increased
substantially since 1950. To the extent these wells are hydraul-
ically connected to the Conejcs or the Rio Grande, they may
affect the flows of those streams below the index gauging stations.
Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the effect that
wells may have upon various streams. No attempt was made in
the evidence to identify amounts of depletion caused by any
particular well.
In the Valley there is not a direct one-for-one effect
upon stream flow in the amount of water pumped minus the
amount of return flow to a surface stream, because of the
widespread occurrence of a highly significant phenomena. The
naturally occurring relatively non-beneficial consumptive use
of water by phreatophytes and native grasses accounts for a
very large portion of the annual loss of water in the San
Luis Valley. When wells are pumped one of the effects is
the lowering the water table, directly in the case of unconfined
aquifer pumping and indirectly by means of reduced leakage in
the case of confined aquifer withdrawals. The lowefing of
the water table causes a substantial salvage of the loss by
evapotranspiration. The evidence shows that the phreatophytes
involved in this case, rabbit brush and greasewood, which
together with the cottonwoods which occur along the stream
channels, cause a very large portion of the "non-beneficial"
consumptive use. 	 The evidence shows that in many cases the
amount of salvaged evapotranspiration is in the same order of
magnitude as total well pumping.
1973 C.R.S. 37-92-502 states: "The materiality of
injury depends on all factors which will determine in each
case the amount of water such discontinuance will make avail-




administered on the basis of the circumstances relating
to it - - - ." (emphasis added) This statute makes it
abundantly clear that no total or partial discontinuance
or any diversion, well or otherwise, shall be ordered
unless that diversion is causing or will cause material
injury to water 'rights having senior priorities. The
materiality of injury must be determined as to each well
after consideration of the factors required by Section 502.
Some of these wells may have minimal or even beneficial
effect, while others may cause material injury to water rights
having senior priorities. Until the Division Engineer
determines the materiality of injury to senior priorities
caused by a specific well, as required by 1973 C.R.S. 37-92-502,
that well may not be curtailed.
The average annual obligation of Colorado under the Rio
Grande Compact from 1940 through 1977, a period of 38 years,
was 292,118 acre feet of water.
The Valley alluvium is some 30,000 feet deep and
saturated with water. In the upper 6,000 feet of the alluvium
there are in excess of two billion (2,000,000,000) acre feet
of ground water. A mere 0.015 per cent, or 15/100,000th
of this would completely satisfy the annual Compactrobligation.
Mr. Philip A. Emery of the U. S. Geological Survey, having
made an extended in-depth study of water in the San Luis Valley
and recognized as an expert on the subject, testified that up
to 1,400,000 acre feet of water annually is now lost to non-
beneficial evapotranspiration by phreatophytes and that by
increasing ground water production and lowering the water table
12.5 feet in areas not under crop, over one million (1,000,000)
acre feet of water now lost to non-beneficial evapotranspiratiOn
could be salvaged. It would require less than 30 per cent of
this salvaged water to satisfy Colorado's Compact obligation.
Mr. Emery stated that pumped water comes mostly from salvaged
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ground water that would have been lost to non-beneficial
evapotranspiration (84%) and the balance is from ground
water storage (14%) and only two (2) per cent from the
Rio Grande; that eighty-six (86) per,cent of the water
supplied by surface inflow and precipitation is consumed
by evapotranspiration; and that more wells rather than
fewer are needed. His assessment was concurred in by
many of the engineers and others familiar with the water
system of the Valley.
The means must be found to salvage the huge quantity
of water presently wasted to non-beneficial evapotranspiration
and to tap the enormous supply of water underground in the
San Luis Valley.
In Kuiper v. Well Owners Association, 176, Colo. 119,
at 147 (1971), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the lower
court had erred in ruling that regulations permitted appro-
priators to command the whole flow of the stream because
the well curtailment schedule did not cause pumping to cease
more than 3/7ths of the time. The plain implication of the
basis of the reversal is that had the regulations required
total curtailment, as do the present proposed rules and
regulations, they would have commanded the whole flow of
the stream.
The Supreme Court in the Kuiper case also held that the
owner of a surface decree could not be compelled to first
apply his well water to that decree before making a call on
junior appropriators. The well involved was an existing well
and thus apparently already under priority. A requirement for
such use of an existing well might be unconstitutional.
However, in the case before us the rule in Xuiper does not
preclude an administrative requirement that before a senior
appropriator can command the whole flow of the stream, whether
above or below ground surface, to facilitate the taking of
a mere fraction of that flow, he employ an efficient means of
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diversion. This may take the form of requiring the senior
appropriator to drill a new well or wells to augment or
replace his surface water diversion before he can require
curtailment of junior rights. Thus maximum utilization through
conjunctive use can be achieved. This complies with 1973
C.R.S. 37-92-102, which states:
"(1) --- it is the policy of this state to integrate
the appropriation, use, and administration of under-
ground water tributary to a stream with the use of
surface water in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the water of this state."
"(2) --- it is hereby declared to be the further
policy of the state of Colorado that in the determi-
nation of water rights, uses, and administration of
water the following principles shall apply:"
"(b) --- but, at his own point of diversion
on a natural water course, each diverter must
establish some reasonable means of effectuating
his diversion. He is not entitled to command
the whole flow of the stream merely to facilitate
his taking the fraction of the whole flow to which
he is entitled."
The above section codified a judicial principle which
originated in Schodde v. Twin Falls Land 	 Water Co., 224
U. S. 107 (1912), and was adopted by Colorado in City of
Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 336 P2d 552 (1961).
While neither case dealt with the relationship between stream
flows and tributary groundwater, the "waterwheel" principle
of Schodde is directly applicable to water use in the San Luis
Valley. Together, Schodde, Bender, and the Water Right Deter-
mination and Administration Act of 1969 establish that, under
certain circumstances, a surface stream appropriator has a
duty to withdraw groundwater tributary to the stream in order
to satisfy his surface appropriation.
Schodde dealt with the relationship of senior and junior
stream appropriators. An upstream senior, who had used the
river's current to power waterwheels sought to enjoin a down-
stream junior who, by damming the stream, had rendered the
waterwheels useless. The court held that, under the law of




merely to facilitate the method rather than the amount of
diversion will not be tolerated.
With Bender Colorado adopted and extended the "water-
wheel" doctrine, first applying the doctrine to groundwater
and, second expressly requiring a senior appropriator to
improve his means of diversion to reach a supply of water
adequate to satisfy his appropriation. Bender, a senior
appropriator of underground water, alleged that groundwater
diversions by junior appropriators had lowered the water
table below the intake of his pumping facilities. The court
held that, although Bender could not be required to improve
his extraction facilities beyond his "economic reach," if
adequate means for reaching a sufficient supply were
available, provision for such means would be decreed at
the expense of junior appropriators.
The Bender court announced that:
(ejach diverter must establish some reasonable
means of effectuating his diversion. He is not
entitled to command the whole or a substantial
flow of the stream merely to facilitate his
taking the fraction of the whole flow to which
he is entitled. . . . 	 This principle applied to
diversion of underflow or underground water means
that priority of appropriation does not give a
right to an inefficient means of diversion, such
as a well which reaches to such a shallow depth'
into the available water supply that a shortage
would occur to such senior even though diversion
by others did not deplete the stream below where
there would be an adequate supply for the senior's
lawful demand. 366 P.2d at 555.
Although not formally announced until Fellhauer V. People,
167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968), recognition that
"maximum utilization" of water is a necessary policy of the
state, underlies the Bender decision. The policy of "maximum
utilization" requires reasonable means of diversion. In short,
Bender provides that the allocation of costs beyond the economic
reach of the senior appropriator to the junior appropriator
constitutes the sole limitation on the senior's duty to effect-




IzrFellhauer, the court expressly chose not to decide
whether a senior stream appropriator has a duty to withdraw
groundwater that is both tributary to the stream and sufficient
to satisfy his appropriation. Yet this duty is a necessary
outgrowth of three forces: Cl) Bender and the enactment of
the "waterwheel" doctrine in 5 37-92-102(2)(b); (2) the policy
of "maximum utilization' of the state's water as announced
in Fellhauer; and (3) the directive of the Water Right Deter-
mination and Administration Act of 1969 that the 'appropriation,
use, and administration of underground water tributary to a
stream with the use of surface water" be integrated. 5 37-92-
102(1), C.R.S. 1973.
Section 37-92-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973, The water Right
Determination and Administration Act, recognized that surface
water of a stream, together with groundwater tributar y to that
stream, constitutes a stream system. The rules and regulations
proposed by the State Engineer require the curtailment of wells
on the basis of assumed injury to surface rights. Yet the
rules and regulations make no effort to require stream appropri-
ators to tap the enormous supply of water underlying the surface
of the Valley. Thus the rules and regulations are contrary
to the policy directives and the law expressed by both the
legislature and the courts.
Several suggestions by some of the engineers who have been
involved in this trial offer additional possibilities and hope
of successful resolution of the water problems facing the
San Luis Valley. Some of these suggestions include:
1. Elimination of the wasteful practice of sub-
irrigation.
2. Encouragement of improved irrigation efficiency,
such as increased use of sprinklers.
3. Prohibit the wasteful practice of allowing
diverted water to collect in barrow pits,
pot holes and other areas, only to evaporate.
4. Promote the Closed Basin Project.
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5. Construct new wells and use existing wells to
deliver both confined and unconfined water to
help satisfy Compact obligations.
6. Construct new drains and rehabilitate existing
drains to salvage water presently lost to non-
beneficial evapotranspiration.
7. Initiate channel rectification program to prevent
the wasteful overflow losses on critical reaches
of the river system in the Valley.
8. A systematic augmentation plan for direct flow
rights and wells from the confined and unconfined
aquifers, pursuant to ongoing research to deter-0
mine the effect of such augmentation upon senior
priority rights.
9. Development of reservoirs to store pre-Compact
direct flow rights.
10. Additional purchase of existing water rights and
release of those waters to the streams.
These and other proposals should be thoroughly investigated
and implemented where feasible. In some instances the costs
should be borne by the water user directly benefited thereby.
In other instances the costs should be borne by a local or
regional agency, such as the Rio Grande Conservation District.
Many of these proposals can be implemented by the State
Engineer under his present statutory authority. Others can be
promoted and developed privately or by public agencies under
aggressive leadership of the State Engineer.
Irrigation development and water use on Rio Grande
tributaries other than the Conejos River at the time of the
Compact study period was such that those streams contributed
little water to the mainstem except occasional flood flows.
The Compact proceedings and the Rio Grande Joint Investigation
contain a number of references to this fact. In light of this
circumstance, the Compact negotiators omitted index gauging
stations for these lesser tributaries. However, they did not
exclude these tributaries from the Compact obligation. They
could have so stated in the Compact, had that been their
intention.
The Motions for Summary Judgment and the claim of res
judicata and collateral estoppel by Trinchera Water Conservancy
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District and Trinchera Irrigation Company should be denied.
The waters that must be delivered to downstream states under
the Compact, pursuant to the doctrine of equitable apportion-
ment are not subject to Colorado's priority system. The rights
to those waters are vested in users in the downstream states
and the conflicting claims of Colorado users are, therefore,
invalid.
The first sentence of the Compact states:
The state of Colorado, the state of New Mexico, and
the state of Texas, desiring to remove all causes of
present and future controversy among these states and
between citizens of one of these states and citizens
of another state with respect to the use of the waters
of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman, Texas, and being
moved by considerations of interstate comity, and for
the purpose of effecting an equitable apportionment
of such waters, ---"
The Compact at Article III (4) states:
"Rio Grande at Lobatos less Conejos at mouths is the
total flow of the Rio Grande at the U.S.G.S. gauging
station near Lobatos, less the discharge of Conejos
river at its mouths, during the calendar year."
(emphasis added)
These and other references make it clear that the Compact
applies to all tributaries of the Rio Grande. Also, the
evidence established that the underground flows of the
tributaries contribute to the Rio Grande at Lobatos.
The protests of The Alamosa La Jara Water Users, The
Hickory-Jackson Ditch Company, Commonwealth Irrigation Company,
Trinchera Water Conservancy District and Trinchera Irrigation
Company should be denied. However, when the State Engineer
determines that delivery of water from these tributaries to
the mainstem of the Rio Grande would be futile or wasteful,
he has the authority to choose not to administer the streams
or curtail diversions.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That the Proposed
Rules and Regulations of the State Engineer and the Motions
for Summary Judgment are disapproved as specified and for
the reasons hereinbefore stated.
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[4] We hold, therefore, that the trial court's finding that the plain-
tiff waived its right as granted in portion two of the judgment. to a hearing
on additional attorney fees is supported fully by the record.
Accordingly. we reverse the court of appeals decision and remand
with directions to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs motion
for an award of additional attorney fees.
MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE does not participate.
No. 79SA38
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District; Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District; Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation
District v. John Huston; Alan Leafier; Wallace Yaffe, d/b/a various
John Doe and Richard Roe joint ventures; Nedlog Technological Group;
Colorado Pacific Energy; Colorado Pacific Aztec; and Bob Johnston, Jr.
(593 P 2d 1347)
Decided April 16, 1979. Rehearing denied April 30, 1979. Rehearing denied May 7,
1979.
Original proceeding in which a number of water cases have been con-
solidated in order that there may be a determination of common questions
of law. These cases arise from applications for adjudication of rights in
non-tributary underground waters apparently not located within any des-
ignated ground water basin and supreme court is asked to comply with
this request under its supervisory powers granted by Colo. Const. Art. VI,
§ 2. Rule to show cause issued.
Rule Made Absolute
I. WATER RIGHTS — Water Judge — Jurisdiction— "Water Matters - — Non-
Tributary Water — Statute. Under section 37-92-203(1), C.R.S. 1973, the
water judge has been given jurisdiction with respect to "water matters"; in addi-
tion, the supreme court has stated that non-tributary water, which has not been
designated as ground water, is included within the term "water matters."
2. Water Judge or as District Judge — Jurisdiction — Applications —
Determine — Questions. The water judge, either as a water judge or as a district
judge, has jurisdiction to determine any questions which may properly be raised
concerning respondents' applications in instant case.
3. COURTS — Supreme Court — Appel late Jurisdiction — General
Superintending Control — Inferior Courts. Under the Colorado Constitution,
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superintending control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limita-
tions as may be prescribed by law.
4.	 Supreme Court — "Superintending Cmaral .. — a)nstIr :Mutt - Harmun.
— Judicial System. One of the purposes of the "superintending control" over ail
inferior courts, which has been granted to the supreme court under the Colorado
Constitution, is to insure the harmonious working of the judicial system.
5. WATER RIGHTS — Supreme Court — Supervisory Power — Constitution —
Basis — Original Jurisdiction — Non-Tributary Underground Waters —
Harmony — Judicial System. The constitutional supervisory power granted to
the supreme court is a proper basis for the present exercise of original jurisdiction
in cases arising from applications for adjudication of rights in non-tributary un-
derground waters apparently not located within any designated ground water ba-
sin; moreover, such action is necessary to insure the harmonious working of the
state's judicial system.
6. Additional Water Judge — Each of Seven Water Divisions — Compliance
— Statutes. Where chief justice temporarily assigned an additional water judge
to each of the seven water divisions — referred to here as the special water judge
— who will act as the water judge of the cases consolidated in instant proceeding,
sitting in the county or counties which he shall desi gnate, held, this procedure, as
such, disposes of the argument that the supreme court is taking original jurisdic-
tion away from the water judges: actually. the court is compiying with the stat-
utes.
7. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Common Questions of Law — Joint Hearing
— Consolidation. Under C.R.C.P. 42(a), when actions involvin g a common ques-
tion of law are pending . before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions: further, it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may also make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
8. WATER RIGHTS — Consolidation for Determination — Common Questions of
Law — Change of Venue — Negative. In an ori ginal proceeding involving van-
ous alleged rights to take or appropriate non-tributary water outside of designated
water basins under many applications pending before water judges, the supreme
court — in ordering that applications be consolidated for determination of com-
mon questions of law by an additional water judge — is not changing venue.
9. Consolidation — Common Questions of Law — Statutes — Standing. With
reference to the matter of standing to obtain consolidation for the purpose of de-
termination of certain common questions of law, supreme court is of the view that
the petitioners in instant case do have standing under the powers granted to them
by sections 37-45-102 and sections 37-47-101 and 107, C.R.S. 1973, and also in
light of the court's discussion concerning the State Engineer's authority as set
forth in Wadsworth v. Kuiper. 193 Colo. 95, 562 P.2d 1114 (1977).
10. Common Questions of Law — Not Answered by Previously Announced
Colorado Law. With reference to the contention that the common questions of
law suggested by the petition are already settled by constitutional or statutory pro-
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vision or b) case law, supreme court is not at all satisfied that the are answered
by previousl) announced Colorado law.
11. Surface Water Rights — Claim — Speculative — Prohibited. A claim to
surface water rights cannot be predicted solel) upon speculative purposes.
12. Non-Tributary Water — Various Alleged Rights — Appropriations —
Consolidation of Actions — Due Process — Equal Protection. In an original
proceeding involving various alleged rights to take or appropriate non - tributary
water outside of designated water basins under many applications pending before
water judges, ordered, that applications be consolidated for determination of com-
mon questions of law by an additional water judge: and making the rule absolute
will not constitute a dental of due process or a violation of equal protection.
13. Single Water Judge — Instead of Piecemeal — Decisions by Seven
Different Judges — Speedier Determination — Questions of Law. Since the
questions of law involved in instant case are fundamental, their determination in
an orderly and studied fashion should take place with all feasible speed; thus, hav-
ing a single water judge, who can consider all aspects of all claims involved, de-
cide these questions subject to the right of appellate review, instead of having
them decided piecemeal by seven different judges on differing time schedules with
many possible appeals. will achieve the result all seek, namely, speedier determina-
tion.
Original Proceeding
Fairfield and Woods, Charles J. Beise. Howard Holme, for petitioner
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
Davis, Graham & Stubbs, John M. Sayre, for petitioner Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District.
Maynes, Bradford & Duncan, for petitioner Southwestern Colorado
Water Conservation District.
J. D. MacFarlane, .Attorney General, Hubert A. Farbes, Jr., First
Assistant, Vicki J. Fowler, Assistant, Jack Wesoky, Assistant, for co-
petitioner C. J. Kuiper, State Engineer.
Yegge, Hall & Evans, Michael D. White, John D. Phillips, Harvey
\V. Curtis, Charles B. White, for respondents John H. Huston, Alan
Leaffer and Wallace Yaffe.
Holme, Roberts & Owen, Kenneth J. Burke, Marilyn G. Alkire, for










' See sections 37-90-101 et seq.. C.R.S. 1973.
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Calkins. Kramer. Grimshaw 	 Harring. Wayne B. Schroeder. for re-
spondents Colorado Pacific Ener g y and Colorado Pacific A7tc...c.
Saunders. Snyder. Ross & Dickson, P.C.. W. B. Tourtillot, Jr. for re-
spondent Bob Johnston. Jr.
Fischer, Brown, Huddleson & Gunn. Ward H. Fischer. Steven B.
Ray, for amici curiae Jackson County Water Conservancy District. Cache
La Poudre Water Users Association and City of Fort Collins, Colorado.
Steinmark & Lawrence, Kim R. Lawrence. for amicus curiae Central
Colorado Water Conservancy District.
En Banc.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an original proceeding in which we have been requested to
consolidate a number of water cases in order that there may be a determi-
nation of common questions of law. These cases arise from applications for
the adjudication of rights in non-tributary underground waters apparently
not located within any designated ground water basin.' We are asked to
comply with this request under our supervisory powers granted by Colo.
Cons:. Art. VI, § 2. We issued a rule to show cause and now make the
rule absolute.
On January 24, 1979 the petition commencing these proceedings was
filed by Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District. Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District and Southwestern Colorado Water
Conservation District. Shortly thereafter the State Engineer asked for,
and was granted, permission to join in the prayer for relief contained in
the petition.
The respondents are referred to as follows:
John Huston, Allan Leaffer and Wallace Yaffe, d/b/a various John Doe
and Richard Roe Joint Venturers . — the "Joint Venturers";
Nedlog Technological Group — "Nedlog";
Colorado Pacific Energy and Colorado Pacific Aztec — "Colorado Pa-
cific"; and
Bob Johnston, Jr. — "Johnston".
Apr. '79]	 SoutheastIn Colo. Wtr. v. Huston	 369
On December 28 and 29. 1978 the Joint Venturers. Nedlog and John-
ston filed separate applications for non-tributary underground water
rights. In the documents before us we have observed no connection be-
tween these three claimants. At about the same time Colorado Pacific
filed for 148 wells. Colorado Pacific states that 92 of these were from non-
tributary sources and that "[n]o such allegation was made" as to the other
56. Colorado Pacific disavows any connection with the other respondents.
It appears that the respondents have filed over 100 cases 2 involving
claims for thousands of wells and over 20 million acre feet of water in un-
derground reservoirs.
The common questions of law suggested in the petition are:
I. Does the water judge have jurisdiction over these claims?
2. Can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of designated water
basin be appropriated by non-owners of the surface?
3. Are such waters subject to appropriation under the Colorado Constitu-
tion?
4. Can such applications be filed without first applying for permits from
the State Engineer?
5. Can appropriations be made for speculative purposes in uses by persons
other than the claimants?
The prayer of the petition is "that this Court desi gnate one water judge of
one division to hear and determine all common questions of law, staying
all proceedings in all other cases in all other divisions until final determi-
nation of said legal questions."
We do not submit the questions in precisely the manner suggested by
the petitioners nor grant all of the relief requested, as we set forth below.
The chief justice of this court is appointing the same district judge as
an additional water judge in each of the seven water divisions of the state.
For convenience, he is here called the special water judge. Our ruling in
capsulized form, to be expanded later in this opinion, is that the applica-
tions of the respondents for decrees awarding them rights to non-tributary
waters are assigned to the special water judge in order that there may be a
determination of the threshold question (Q1) of whether non-tributary
waters in Colorado are subject to appropriation; and, in the event that the
answer to this question is in the affirmative, for the determination of the
following additional questions of law:
Q2. By what authority can such waters be appropriated?
Q3. Can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of designated




Joint Venturers set forth in one of their briefs that 122 "applications" have been filed in the
matters designated b the petitioners. "Applications" as here used, we believe means the same as
"cases."
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interest in the surfacL.?
Q4. Can non-tributany v.at:rs outsic.l . .; the bound,trit:s oFt.tt;:)i471:
ground water basins be appropriated for use by persons other than the
claimant or those whom the claimant is authorized to represent?
Q5. Can applications for non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of
designated ground water basins be filed (a) without first obtaining permits
from the State Engineer and. if so, (b) without first applying for such per-
mits?
We are not here staying proceedings in cases other than those involved in
the applications of the respondents.
[1,21 We are not directing that in the consolidated proceeding there
be a determination of the question as to whether the water judge has juris-
diction over these clgims. In Perdue v. Ft. Lyon Canal, 184 Colo. 219,
519 P.2d 954 (1974), we called attention to the provision of section 37-92-
203(1), C.R.S. 1973 3 to the effect that the water judge has been given ju-
risdiction with respect to "water matters." We there stated that non-
tributary water, which has not been designated as ground water, is in-
cluded within the term "water matters." In that opinion we called atten-
tion to the fact that a water judge is a district judge and stated that.
"When the water judge wears two hats, it would approach an absurdity to
say that he must rule in two different actions to bring about the (ultimate)
result . . . ." Whatever the rights of the respondents may or may not be.
we think that it has already been determined that the water judge. either
as a water judge or as a district judge, has jurisdiction to determine any
questions which may properly be raised concerning the respondents' appli-
cations. See Oliver v. District Court, 190 Colo. 524, 549 P.2d 770
(1976).
The respondents have made a number of objections. These may be
classified as follows:
A. Jurisdictional objections.
I. This court's supervisory power provides no basis for its exercise of origi-
nal jurisdiction.
2. The water courts have exclusive jurisdiction of water matters within
their divisions.
3. Only trial courts can order consolidation, and no motions for consolida-
tions have been filed with them.
4. This court cannot change venlie.
5. Cases pending in different divisions may not be consolidated.
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B. Objections as to parties.
I. The petitioners have no standin g to bring this proceeding and are not
parties to many of the cases pending in the water courts.
1 . Persons in interest are not parties here and, therefore, consolidation at
this time is premature.
3. The petitioners have failed to designate the particular application to
which they have filed statements of opposition.
4. There is no identity of interest among the respondents.
5. The water judges have not been joined in this proceeding.
C. Objections as to subject matters.
I. Common questions of law are not involved in this proceeding.
1 . The "common questions of law" have already been resolved.
3. The petition does not adequately describe the matters sought to be con-
solidated.
4. Speculative purposes involve differing facts in different cases.
D. To make the rule absolute would constitute a denial of due process of
law and a violation of equal protection under the law.
E. Making the rule absolute would result in unnecessary delay.
III. A-1
[3,4] The supervisory powers granted to this court by the constitu-
tion are:
"The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constitution,
shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the
state, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior
courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by
law." Colo. Cons:. Art. VI, § 2(1).
One of the purposes of the "superintending control" provision is "to insure
the harmonious working of our judicial system." People v. Richmond, 16
Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891); In re Assignment of Huff, 352 Mich. 402,
91 N.W.2d 613 (1958).
Joint Venturers have filed applications in each of the seven water di-
visions of our state. It appears that, absent consolidation, seven different
water judges will have before them most if not all of the questions of law
above mentioned under Article I. These are difficult questions. Beyond the
waste of judicial time, there is the very present possibility that the seven
judges might come to different conclusions. These questions involve mat-
ters of great public importance. This importance is not only to the many
persons whose rights may be involved, but to the General Assembly as it
reviews the present state of constitutional and statutory law relating to
water rights and seeks solutions to legal problems which are capable of so-
lution by it.
[51 We have been told that a rule such as we are here making abso-
lute should be issued only with grcat care and under extraordinary
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ing the rule absolute meets those conditions. We are thorou g hly convinced
that our action is necessary to insure the harmonious orkmu of J r Judi-
cial system. The constitutional supervisory power granted to this court i:,
proper basis for making the rule absolute.
Ill. A-2
[6] It is argued that there is no authority for the proposal "that a
single water judge be conferred extraordinary jurisdiction over applica-
tions for water rights filed by various applicants in different water divi-
sions." This argument is predicated upon the following statutory provi-
sions:
"There is established in each water division the position of water judge of
the district courts of all counties situated entirely or partly within the divi-
sion. Said district courts collectively acting through the water judge have
exclusive jurisdiction of water matters within the division, and no judge
other than the one designated as a water judge shall act with respect to
water matters in that division . . . ." Section 37-92-203(1), C.R.S. 1973.
We are complying with the statutes. Subsection (2) of section 203
provides;
"The water judge for a particular division shall be selected from among
the judges of the district courts of the counties situated entirely or partly
within the division; except that the chief justice may make temporary as-
signments of other judges."
As mentioned, contemporaneously with the announcement of this opinion.
the chief justice is temporarily assigning an additional water judge to each
of the seven water divisions, referred to here as the special water judge. He
will act as the water judge of the cases consolidated in this proceeding, sit-
ting in the county or counties which he shall designate. Section 37-92-
203(3), C.R.S. 1973.
This procedure disposes of the argument that we are taking original
jurisdiction away from the water judges. Later, we may be reviewing the
decisions of the special water judge on these questions of law, but we are
not exercising original jurisdiction to answer them in the first instance.
III. A-3
[7] It is argued that only the water courts can order consolidation.
This argument is predicated upon C.R.C.P. 42(a) which reads:
"When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending be-
fore the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the mat-
ten in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
A reading of C.R.C.P. 42(a) answers the argument. These provisions re-
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III. A-4
[8] In support of the argument that this court cannot change venue,
the Joint Venturers cite section 37-92-203 and 304(4). C.R.S. 1973 and
C.R.C.P. 98. We have already addressed ourselves to the argument under
section 203. Rule 98 is the venue rule. We are not changing venue. The
Joint Venturers quOte the portion of section 304(4) reading:
f an applicant, a person who has filed a statement of opposition, or a
protestant requests, the hearing shall be conducted by the water judge in
the district court of the county in which is located the point of diversion of
the water right or conditional water right involved."
Counsel then state in their brief:
"In order to insure that there be no uncertainty as to this point, Respon-
dents hereby state that they will assert their statutory right, pursuant to
§ 37-92-304(4). that all hearings concerning any conditional water rights, in
which they have an interest, be conducted in the district courts of the
counties in which are located the points of diversion of the water rights in-
volved."
This challenge consists of a statement of intent to make an assertion in the
water court. If counsel proceed as they state, then they should do so in or-
der that the matter may be heard by the special water judge.
III. A-5
We have already made disposition of most of the objections raised un-
der III. A-5. Remaining portions of such objections are without merit. We
do mention a partial paradox as to the objection that cases pending in dif-
ferent divisions may not be consolidated. Nedlog moved in Water Division
Nos. 5 and 6 that its applications filed in those divisions be consolidated
on the ground that they involve common questions of law and fact. The
motion states:
"Consolidation of these Applications as sought herein will promote the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the uses presented to avoid
unnecessary costs and delay and inconsistent determinations, and promote
the policies and purposes of C.R.C.P. Rules 1(a) and 42(a)."
In fairness to Nedlog, it should be stated that it was not among the re-
spondents who made the objection that cases pending in different divisions
could not be consolidated.
III. B
We now consider the respondents' objections as to parties.
[9] All respondents have contended that the petitioners do not have
standing.
The petitioners have made the following allegations: that the peti-
tioner Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District has filed objec-
tions to all of the claims of the Joint Venturers in Water Divisions 2 and 5,
to all of the claims in Nedlog in Division 5, and to all of the claims of
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Conservation District has filed or is filin g objections to all of the Colorado
Pacific claims in Division 7: and that the petitioner Northern Colorado
Conservancy District is filing objections Co the respondents' claims in Divi-
sions I and 5. When the State Engineer entered this proceedin g . he ,L1LCC
that he is filing statements of opposition to all of the applications for watt;
rights involved in this proceeding.
Under the powers granted to the petitioners by sections 37-45-102
and 118 and sections 37-47-101 and 107. C.R.S. 1973, and in light of the
discussion concerning the State Engineer's authority in Wadsworth
Kuiper, 193 Colo. 95, 562 P.2d 1114 (1977), we have no doubt as to the
standing of either of the petitioners or the State Engineer to request the
relief here asked. We are only concerned here with the question of whether
petitioners have standing to obtain consolidation for the purpose of deter-
mining certain common questions of law. The many "standing" cases cited
by petitioners are not applicable to this particular issue. We hold that
there is standing here.
We do not perceive the alleged prematurity of this proceeding, and
we find the objections as to parties in this respect without merit.
III. C-I
Joint Venturers and Nedlog take the position that for an issue to con-
stitute a common question of law it must be common to every respondent
and every application for water right. The only authority cited for this as-
sertion is Willy v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 115 Colo. 306, 172 P.2d
958 (1946). In contrast, we are considering a common question of law to
be one common to more than one of the respondents. Johnston vigorously
insists that he should not be included in this consolidation because he "is
seeking a conditional decree on ground water rights to protect and pre-
serve those rights underlying his own land." In its objection to Johnston's
application, the Southeastern . Colorado Water Conservancy District has
alleged: that the water involved is not subject to appropriation: that appro-
priations cannot be initiated for speculative purposes: and that no more
waters can be appropriated from deep wells than are required for benefi-
cial use on lands overlying the same. Johnston's application claims 71 cu-
bic feet per second of time of water to serve "agricultural, residential,
commercial, and/or industrial development of the property described . . .
and such other land as may be served directly or served through exchange
or augmentation," and asks that the water be determined to be non-
tributary. The Johnston application for 53 wells involves questions corn-
mon to the other petitioners.
III. C-2
1101 The Joint Venturers state in one of their briefs: "The 'common
questions of law' suggested by the petition are already settled by constitu-
tional or statutory provision or by case law." The question as to the
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The first of the common questions is whether non-tributary water in
Colorado is subject to appropriation. It is to be noted that the question we
pose is broader than that suggested by the petitioners. namely. are such
lt a t ers subject to appropriation under the Colorado Constitution?
Do the following constitutional provisions include non-tributary
water:
"The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within
the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided." Colo. Const. Art. XVI, § 5.
"The ri ght to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied . . . ." Colo. Const. Art. XVI, § 6.
"All persons and corporations shall have the right-of-way across public,
private and corporate lands for the construction of ditches, canals and
flumes for the purpose of conveying water for domestic purposes, for the
irrigation of a gricultural lands, and for mining and manufacturing pur-
poses, and for drainage, upon payment of just compensation." Colo.
Const. Art. XVI, § 7.
If these constitutional provisions do not apply to non-tributary waters,
then as to such waters which are not "designated ground water" what is
the effect of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969 (section 37-92-101 a seq., C.R.S. 1973) and the Colorado Ground
Water Management Act (section 37-90-101 et seq., C.R.S. I973)?
We have reread the "developed water" cases, such as Leadville Co.
v. Sweet, 91 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932); Conine v. Sweet, 75 Colo.
199. 225 P. 214 (1924); Ripley v. Park Center Co., 40 Colo. 129,90 P.
75(1907): and Platte Valley Co. v. Buckers Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 P. 334
(1898). We have questions as to the applicability of these cases to the non-
tributary water problems posed here. We are not unmindful of
Sweetwater Co. v. Schubert, 188 Colo. 379, 535 P.2d 215 (1975) and
Pikes Peak v. Kuiper, 169 Colo. 309, 455 P.2d 882 (1969).
Without pursuing the Joint Venturers' assertion further, we simply
state that, from the fact that we ask these questions as to the instant appli-
cations, it can be deduced that we are not satisfied that they are answered
by previously announced Colorado law.
.	 III. C-3
We do not agree with the contention that the petition herein does not
adequately describe the matters involved.
III. C-4
Most of the respondents have presented the ar g ument — rather con-
vincingly — that any ruling as to the matter of speculative purposes de-
pends upon the particular facts of the individual case. We agree that to
apply a general rule concerning this subject does require consideration of
the facts of the application before the court. That, however, does not 7
5.1?
•
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prevent the special water judge, who hears the matters involved in this
proceedin g . from applying the general rules involved to the facts of the ap-
plications of the respondents.
[111 This court has held that a claim to surface water rights cannot
be predicated solely upon speculative purposes. Denver v. Northern
Colorado. Water Conservancy District. 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992
(1954): Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Company, 17 Colo. 146. 28 P. 966
(1892). This court shortly will announce its opinion in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Co.. 197 Colo. 413,
594 P.2d 566 (1979) which deals with the question. The special water
judge will have the guidance of those cases in addressing the related ques-
tion of whether non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of a desig-
nated ground water basin can be appropriated except for use by the re-
spondents or others whom the respondents are authorized to represent.
III. D
[121 The Joint Venturers and Johnston argue that making the rule
absolute will constitute a denial of due process of law and a violation of
equal protection under the law. The only cases cited for this proposition
are People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975): Woodson
v. Ingram. 173 Colo. 65, 477 P.2d 455 (1970); Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171
Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970): and Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320,
447 P.2d 986 (1968). We are unable to perceive the applicability of the
cited cases in the instant proceeding. The statements in support of the ar-
gument are in large part the same as the objections already considered or
are without merit.
Ill. E
[131 Some of the respondents express the opinion that our action
here will result in great delay and consequent prejudice. One of the princi-
pal reasons for our action here is that our prognosis is otherwise. We ap-
pear to be confronted with one of the great emergencies in the history of
Colorado water law. The questions of law here involved are fundamental.
The determination of these questions in an orderly and studied fashion
should take place with all feasible speed. Having a single water judge, who
can consider all aspects of all claims involved, decide these questions sub-
ject to the right of appellate review, instead of having them decided piece-
meal by seven different judges on differing time schedules with many pos-
sible appeals, will achieve the result all seek — speedier determination.
IV.
The special water judge now being appointed by the chief justice shall
be an additional judge in and assigned to each of the seven divisions. This
special water judge hereby has assigned to him all matters connected with
the pending applications of the respondents which are the subject of this
proceeding and which are on file with any of the water clerks of the state.
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thereof, the following:
Applications by any of the Joint Venturers under trade names such as
Dexter Enterprises and Bluepond Associates. examples of which are the
applications in Case No. W-4810 and W-4829 in Water Division No. 2.
Applications of Nedlog Technology Group, an example of which is the ap-
plication in Case No. W-4004 in Water Division No. 5, captioned for fil-
ing in Water Division Nos. 5 and 6.
All applications of Colorado Pacific Aztec and Colorado Pacific Energy,
examples of which are cases numbered W-1905-78 and W-1906-78 filed
in Water Division No. 7.
All applications of Bob Johnston, Jr., an example of which is the applica-
tion filed in Case No. W-4805 in Water Division No, 2.
The special water judge is directed, with the cooperation of the water
clerks of the state and of the other water judges, without delay to compile
and publish a list of the applications which he is to consider under the rule
of this opinion. Either on his own motion or that of any interested person,
the special water judge may add other applications, or delete applications,
from the list. He may certify to this court in this proceeding any questions
in connection with the compilation and publication of such list or amend-
ments thereto, and this court expressly retains jurisdiction of this proceed-
ing for that purpose.
If the special water judge finds that any claim made by any respon-
dent is solely for tributary water to be adjudicated as a part of the
adjudication of decreed tributary priorities under the Water Right and
Administration Act of 1969, and if the special water judge shall find that
such transfer will not prejudice any rights, the special water judge may
transfer such claim to the other water judge of the division involved for
hearing and disposition by the latter.
The special water judge, acting in conjunction with the water clerks
and the other water judges, shall do those things necessary to preserve,
and to protect the integrity of, the files of all matters with which the spe-
cial water judge shall be concerned. In the event of a substantial doubt in
the mind of the special water judge as to the method of preserving the files
and the integrity of the filing, he may address an inquiry concerning the
matter to this court in this proceeding. Jurisdiction in this proceeding is
reserved to consider and answer any such inquiries.
In the event that the special water judge concludes that in the dis-
charge of his duties there must be clarification of any directions or other
statements in this opinion, he may request this court for clarification. We
retain jurisdiction in this proceeding to respond to any such request from
the special water judge for clarification.
If the special water judge has any substantial question as to the pro-
cedures to be followed in carrying out his duties under our rule here
issued, he may address to this court a request for direction in this respect.
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We retain jurisdiction to act upon any such request.
When the special water judge has decided all common question ,
law involved as to any claim, he may certify •ihiu fact to	 3t:11	 i;)N
proceeding with the reouest that an:, rerna:Mr.‘; quesliunz, t)i% L:d in tile
claim be determined by the other water judge of the division. We retain
jurisdiction to accept and act upon any such certification and request.
When the special water jud ge has decided any particular common
question of law submitted hereby. he may enter an order in the nature of
that for which provision is made in C.R.C.P. 54(b) in order that there may
be review of the decision by this court.
We do not intend in this proceeding to reserve jurisdiction to assign to
the special water judge any cases in addition to those now filed by the re-
spondents for non-tributary water. Neither do we reserve jurisdiction here
to stay the processing and determination of any other applications. The
water judges, other than the special water judge. may in their discretion
conclude to hold other applications in abeyance awaiting the outcome of
determination of the common questions of law. In this connection, they
must consider factors which are not before us. We. therefore, decline to is-
sue stays as to any other proceedings.
Rule made absolute.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL
WATER JUDGE (SECTION 31-92-203	 ORDER
(I). C.R.S. 1973)
As a matter complementary to the opinion in original proceeding No.
79SA38 today announced by this court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Honorable M. 0. Shivers, Jr..
Chief Judge of the Eighteenth Judicial District, be and he is hereby ap-
pointed and assigned temporarily as an additional water judge in each of
the seven water divisions of this state, namely, divisions numbered 1, 2. 3.
4, 5, 6 and 7.
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JOHN HUSTON; ALAN LEAFFER;
WALLACE YAFFE, d/b/a various
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COLORADO PACIFIC AZTEC; and




The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado by Order dated
April 16, 1979, consolidated certain specific applications for
adjudication of water rights filed in all seven water divisions of
the state by certain specified claimants. This Court was appointed
as a Special Water Judge in all seven divisions to determine answers
to questions submitted by the Supreme Court in its Order of Consoli-
dation. The case in this Court was entitled as above captioned and
numbered 79-CW-1 (Arapahoe).
This Court first fixed a final date for entry of appearances,
and published notice statewide in all water divisions. Over 102
attorneys entered timely appearances and to facilitate determination
of the issues submitted, and for economical reasons, this Court
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appointed a Trial Committee, composed of attorney personnel from
each of the seven water divisions, together with the Assistant
Attorney General of the State of Colorado, an attorney for each
claimant, and the Assistant United States Attorney.
The Trial Committee was ordered to analyze all pending
applications, thereafter to divide the claims into classes, and
then select one claim in each class fairly representative of all
in that category.
This Court then ruled that it would treat the applications
as being presented somewhat in the nature of a motion to dismiss
under the Rules of Civil Procedure. It would be assumed that all
matters alleged in the representative applications could be proven
and the Court would then, as a matter of law, decide whether
the claimant would be entitled to the relief requested in the
application. The Court's ruling would be under Rule 54(b), CRC?,
1973 CRS.
The determination would be made based upon legal briefs
and oral argument. If the Court needed further evidentiary
information, the Court would request affidavits and the matter
would then be treated as a motion for sunnary judgment under Rule
56(e), with the same result as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)
(5).
Briefs were filed and oral argument held, pursuant to
which the Court is making the following rulings as to the questions
submitted by the Supreme Court.
Unless otherwise specified, non-tributary water and de
minimis non-tributary water will be referred to as being synonymous
under existing case law and, likewise, under existing case law
considered as developed water.
QUESTION NO. 1 (Q.1)
Are non-tributary waters in Colorado subject to
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appropriation?
This question is answered in the affirmative.
Long established law in Colorado is that all ground
water is presumed tributary to a stream and if underground water
is claimed to be non-tributary, the burden is on the one claiming
the non-tributary status to prove that fact by clear and satisfactory
evidence. Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 228, P2d 975; DeHaas v. 
Benisch, 116 Colo. 344, 181 P2d 433; Cowrie v. Sweet, 75 2010. 199,
225 P2d 214; and other cases.
In the applications before this Court, that burden must
somehow be sustained before the question posed becomes an issue
for decision.
The Legislature has recognized that non-tributary ground-
water can be appropriated. From the date of the first legislative
act affecting underground water in designated groundwater basins,
such water has been determined as subject to appropriation.
Fundingsland v. Colorado Groundwater Commission, 171 Colo. 487,
468 P2d 835, and subsequent cases.
Even if water in designated basins may actually in fact
be tributary, if its motion to a stream is de mlnimis, it is still
considered as non-tributary in nature. Rudd:3er v. Lundvall, 187
Colo. 40, 529 P2d 1328, and cases cited therein.
Therefore, if it is not moving in a de minimis manner,
it must axiomatically be non-tributary and if in a designated
groundwater basin, it is clearly subject to appropriation under
37-90-102, CRS 1973.
Since it is concluded that Colorado has recognized non-
tributary underground water in designated basins as appropriable,
it is then further concluded that non-tributary water outside a
designated groundwater basin must likewise be appropriable.
This Court perceives no valid distinction between
non-tributary water in a designated basin and non-tributary water
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outside a designated basin, except the establishment of agencies
to supervise and manage, as provided by law, being superimposed
in the designated basin areas.
The character of the water itself is identically the
same. It is all water and it is all non-tributary.
The determination of the affirmative answer to Question
No. 1, that non-tributary water outside a designated groundwater
basin is subject to appropriation, is not determinative of the
remaining issues. It is here noted that the right to appropriate
waters of this state antedated the State Constitution. Coffin v. 
Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443.
QUESTION NO. 2 (Q.2)
By what authority can such waters be appropriated?
Statute in Colorado, namely, 37-90-137, CRS 1973,
provides the method for the appropriation of non-tributary water
outside a designated groundwater basin. It provides not only the
method, but requirements and time elements involved. Further,
the statutes provide for appeal of actions of the State Engineer,
both before and after the 1979 Amendment to the foregoing section.
It is provided that appeal of decisions of the State Engineer shall
be made to the District Court of the county where the well involved
is located. Prior to court decision, Jackson v. Colorado, 294
Fed. Sup. 1065 (Colorado, 1968), and the 1979 Act, the appeal was
trial de novo, thus eliminating appeal under Rule 106, CRC?,
certiorari review. The 1979 Amendment, 37-90-115, now provides
that the review shall be under 24-4-106, CRS 1973, the Administra-
tive Procedures Act.
While this amendment cannot be applied retroactively
as to those applications pending in this case where no permit
has been requested the State Engineer has not acted and no appeals
are pending, it is the finding of this Court that in any
future action by the State Engineer under 37-90-137, supra,
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appeal must be to the county where the well is located and the
procedure to be followed would be under 24-4-106, CRS 1973, except
as to some Nedlog claims. As to those, this Court rules that
by reason of the consolidation of the applications and the time
involved in reaching a conclusion in this case, time limitations
for appeal are stayed as to the actions of the State Engineer
and where such actions occurred prior to this consolidation, anyone
desiring to appeal the State Engineer's rulings shall have the
time set forth under the Administrative Procedures Act, beginning
with final determination of this case, unless time for appeal of
the State Engineer's action had fully expired both prior to the
1979 Amendment and prior to the consolidation of these claims for
determination by this Court.
Regardless of some proceedings conducted by individual
Water judges in some of the seven divisions, this Court does not
interpret 37-92-302(2), CRS 1973, as creating a method for appeal
of a decision of the State Engineer. This section only provides
for a requirement to be fulfilled before the Water Court can make
rulings and orders. Nothing in Article 92, Chapter 37, creates
a substitute for the appellate procedure provided for in 37-90-115.
supra, and review of the State Engineer's actions under said
Section 115 is held to be a prerequisite to any right in the Water
Court to proceed under 37-92-302, supra.
Analysis of the various statutes, beginning with the
Session Laws of 1957, the Act of 1965, and the Act of 1969, discloses
that each and every expression of legislative intention regarding
appeal has been continuously the same; namely, that appeal is to
the District Court of the county where the proposed well is located
(except that under the 1957 Act it was the county where the user
was located.)
Appeal has always been trial de novo until the 1979
Amendment adopting the Administrative Procedures Act, which
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permissively allows the court considering the same on appeal,
to take additional evidence to that disclosed by the record, should
the court considering the appeal in its discretion determine to
do so.
The mere fact that it is possible that the District
Judge in the county of the location of the well might also have
been designated as the Water Judge of a division makes no difference.
On appeals from actions of the State Engineer, he is nonetheless
hearing the matter as a District Judge under 24-4-106, supra, and
not as a Water Judge under 37-92, CRS, supra.
This Court does not share the view, nor the fear, of
some of the applicants that the State Engineer may become a "water
czar." His actions are always subject to review in the proper
District Court.
Therefore, the answer to Question No. 2, as posed by
the Supreme Court, is in the affirmative, that the authority for
appropriation of non-tributary water outside designated groundwater
basins is 37-90-137, CRS 1973, and that appeal is under the
Administrative Procedures Act, 24-4-106, supra, to the District
Court of the county where the proposed well is located in the
event of dispute with or desire to appeal a ruling of the State
Engineer.
QUEST/ON NO. 3 (Q.3)
Can non-tributary water outside the boundaries of
designated groundwater basins be appropriated by persons having
no property interests in the surface?
The answer to this question is a qualified affirmative
as to appropriation only, with the qualification as hereinafter
set forth.
The time has came, as has been inevitably certain, to
distinguish between a well and a surface stream diversion by
headgate and ditch.
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It has been held that "diversion" as a part of an
appropriation was a "court made" theory until the Legislative
Act of 1969, Colorado River Water Conservancy District v. Colorado 
River Conservancy Board, Enwold and Town of Aspen, 197 Colo. 469,
page 473, 594 P2d 570.
The 1969 Legislative Act defined "diversion" and included
"well" as a means thereof.
This Court is, however, of the opinion that there is a
distinct physical difference between a headgate on a stream with
its partners a dam and ditch, as opposed to a well and its partner
the pump. While both may be loosely referred to as diverting water
and achieve the same results with regard to appropriation and
beneficial use, it is this Court's opinion that a "headgate"
requires an interceptor dam impeding a surface flow going in a 
fixed direction, changing the direction of that flow into the head-
gate and ditch.
(That a well pumping water which is tributary might
possibly be somewhat similar is not necessary to the determination
of the questions submitted to this Court in this action.)
As to non-tributary groundwater, the well and pump are
withdrawing or extracting, similar to a mining operation. The
definition in Black's Law Dictionary of the word "diversion" is
that it means turning aside or altering the natural course of a
thing, and the word "divert" means to turn aside, to turn out of
the way, to alter the course of things, usually applied to water
courses.
Since non-tributary water is theoretically not moving in
any particular direction, the well and pump change only the elevation
of the water to apply it to beneficial use. They do not change the
direction of flow or turn aside the direction of the course of the
water.
In effect, they develop or mine, rather than intercept.
They perform this function by means of privately-owned personal
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property in the form of the pump, appurtenant equipment, and
casing, all of which is personal property awned outright by the
developer of the well.
If the water is de minimis non-tributary in nature, it
may have some direction of flow, but the well and pump are still
not turning that direction aside, but are only extracting or with-
drawing water from a semi-static state. De minimis non-tributary
water, if moving, may be doing so in one or several different
directions. Still, the water and pump change elevation, not
direction of flaw, in order to apply the water to a beneficial use.
It is this Court's opinion that the right as set forth
in case law to use another's headgate and ditch should not be
expanded into a right to use another's personal property and well,
located on his realty, without the owner's consent.
To drill and equip and well, one must in almost all cases
be engaged in construction upon privately-awned property. The
right to condemn a right-of-way, as set forth by the Constitution
and statutes, does not apply. The provisions of the State
Constitution and statutes which authorize condemnation of rights-
of-way states as follows:
Constitution: "all persons shall have a right-
of-way across* private lands for the construction
of ditches, canals, and flumes for conveying water."
(Emphasis added.)
This does not grant a right to take land to drill and
construct a well, to develop a well, or to excavate on private
real property.
The statute, 37-86-102, provides that any person "awning"
a water right, or conditional water right, shall be entitled to
a right-of-way through lands which lie between the point of 
diversion and the point of use, or where the proposed use for
the right-of-way is for the purpose of transoorting water.
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Obviously the statute cannot apply until (1) the person
claiming a right-of-way has already become the owner of a water
right or a conditional water right and (2) thereafter the statute
applies only to transporting from one point to another across
intervening lands.
The Court also concludes that 38-2-101, at seq.,
supra, does not apply to condemnation of s or for,wells. The
statutes, 38-1-101 and 102, apply to reservoirs, drains, flumes,
or ditches for agriculture, mining, milling, domestic, or sanita-
tion purposes.
These terms do not include construction work on privately
awned real property, drilling of wells, equipping of wells, and
particularly not to the condemnation of personal property. The
Court is aware that some cases hold that municipal corporations,
or quasi-municipal corporations, formed for specific purposes,
such as an irrigation district, may condemn for a well site, but
where private parties are concerned, even a right to survey is
restricted under the eminent domain Acts to road, tunnel, ditch,
or railroads and to companies formed for those specific purposes.
Hence, if a well, pump, and appurtenant fixtures are
necessary to develop water, apply the same to a beneficial use,
and thus obtain a conditional or absolute water right, one must
have the consent of the landowner, or be the landowner, in order
to conduct the necessary construction involved.
The affirmative answer to Question No. 3 is thus qualified
as to the right of entry to appropriate. There is no such right
unless the proposed appropriator is the landowner, or has the
consent of the landowner first obtained, to erect physical works
upon the real estate.
This Court is not unmindful of the importance of the
maximum use doctrine, as announced in several decisions of the
Supreme Court, but private rights of ownership of real and personal
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property must also be constitutionally protected, and the non-
tributary groundwater will not be lost as a result. It will
eventually be developed in an orderly fashion consistent
with the protection of those private rights.
While water may be appropriable, he means to appropriate
as to non-tributary underground water are, at least at present, in
the absence of further legislative action, limited to the owner of
the land or one utilizing the land with the consent of the owner.
This Court is also aware of the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Bubb and Yaeger v. Christensen, 	 Colo.
, 610 P2d 1343. However, the Honorable Justice Lohr in that
opinion expressly excludes any determination of a right to trespass
to initiate a water right and the footnotes clearly indicate that
the decision is limited to the specific facts of that case; namely,
that the trespass had already occurred, is not a defense to the
entry of a final decree in a water adjudication proceedings, the
landowner had no development of his own, and a condemnation
proceeding was in fact already in process. Further, it was determined
that the water source was note well, but was determined as being
"unnamed springs."
This Court expressly disagrees with any concept that a
claimant may at will commit a trespass to engage in construction
on another's property, or that 37-86-102, et seq., gives any right
to a private person to condemn another's property for purposes of
constructing a well on that land. Again, certain municipal or
quasi-municipal agencies may have such rights. Riverside Irrigation
District v. Lamont, 152 Colo. 151, 572 22d 151.
QUESTION NO. 4 (Q.4)
Can non-tributary water outside designated groundwater
basins be appropriated for use by persons other than the claimant,
or those whom the claimant is authorized to represent?
Case law in Colorado establishes that each case involving
the above issue should be considered on an ad hoc basis. Elk Rifle
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v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 484 P2d 1211, and other cases.
However, if a claim for water in an application for
adjudication is phrased in pure general language for extreme
magnitudes of amount, where the proposed appropriator claims no
ownership in any land, designates no place of use, even in the
broadest of descriptions (as was the case in Taussig v. The Moffat 
Tunnel Commany, 106 Colo. 384, 106 P2d 363), and is thereby
attempting to tie up under a conditional priority date, vast
quantities of underground water and, thus, antedate those who
later might have a real need and uses, and force them to deal with
the owner of the conditional decree, such claim is not within the
principle of the maximum use policy or in line with case law.
Denver v. Northern Colorado Water District, 130 Colo. 375, 276
P2d 992; in the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of 
Mills E. Stinger, et al., v. Uncompagre Valley, 192 Colo. 159, 557
P2d 389; and Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler 
Tunnel Water Company, State of Colorado Department of Natural 
Resources and Lee Enwold, 197 Colo. 413, 594 P2d 566. All these
cases hold at a minimum that by the application for adjudication
may show the purely speculative nature of the claim by the nature
of the language of the application itself.
•	 The answer to Question No. 4, therefore, again is a
qualified affirmative, the qualification being that an
appropriator must have beneficial uses at hand, or actual need,
contact with, or agency with, those having such need and existing
beneficial uses in mind. The application cannot merely argue
maximum use or general need in some unknown area, not even limited
to the state boundaries of the State of Colorado.
The application itself, without other evidence, can
indicate by the size of the quantity claimed and the uses listed
and the general purposes only being stated, that it is pure
speculation for monetary or pecuniary benefit and that the decree
is sought , for profit, rather than actual beneficial use by the
applicant.
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This Court is acutely aware that a conditional decree
can tie up water by priority date for many, many years while
diligence matters and hearings proceed. All too frequently a
showing of due diligence, as required by statute, is found to
be adequate, based on very minute, or minimal, activity. Thus,
huge quantities of water could be claimed as of a certain priority
date, and with an absolute minimum of investment, be withheld
from later appropriators in dire need of development and actual use,
unless tribute is paid to the conditional decree holder.
Water in reasonable Amounts may be appropriated for
beneficial use by owners, or for those who the claimant is author-
ized to represent, where agreements with owners are in process or
actual discussion, or where those in need of the water cannot for
some reason provide the finances necessary to construct the works,
or temporarily, at least, are unable to do so. Then, as in the
Taussig case, supra, a conditional decree might be justified, but
notunder conditions as in the Sunger case, supra, or the Vidler
case, supra.
QUESTION NO. 5 (Q.5)
Can applications for non-tributary waters outside the
boundaries of designated groundwater basins be filed (a) without
first obtaining permits from the State Engineer and, if so, (b)
without first applying for such permits?
This Court is puzzled by the language of the question,
but must assume that the intent of the question would, or should,
include certain omitted words and that the question in fact is
"Can applications for (adjudication of) non-tributary
(underground) water outside the boundaries of designated ground-
water basins be filed (a) without first obtaining permits from
the State Engineer and, if so, (b) without first applying for
such permits?
Since this Court has found no distinction between
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non-tributary water in a designated basin, and non-tributary water
outside a designated basin, with regard to the right to appropriate,
and has further found that 37-90-137, supra, applies as to the
appropriation of water outside a designated basin and, further,
that 37-92-305(6) reauires that evidence of a request for a permit,
either granted or denied, supplement an application for adjudication
before any decree, decision, ruling, or order can be entered by
the Water Court (37-92-302), this Court reaches the following
conclusions:
Although 305(6) of Chapter 37, Article 92, supra,
provides that the referee or Water Court should "consider the
findings of the State Engineer," it seems clear, as this Court
has previously determined, that this does not refer to appellate
procedure. It states that the Water Court "may grant" a decree
unless the denial of the permit is "justified." Also, as hereto-
fore determined, the question of justification is a matter, if a
permit is denied Ifor an appeal, to be determined under the Admini-
strative Procedures Act by the District Court of the county of the
location of the proposed structure. Specifically, Section 305(6),
supra, only sets forth guidelines or standards for the referee and
Water Judge. It does not establish appellate procedures. Appellate
procedures are set forth in Chapter 37, Article 90, supra.
While it is not specifically required by statute that
a permit be issued before the filing of an application in an
adjudication proceeding, or that application for a permit be
made prior to filing an application in an adjudication proceeding,
common sense dictates that there is no chance for any ruling,
decision, or order by the Water Court under 92-302, supra, unless
the permit has either been granted, or appellate procedure from a
deniali or arbitary reduction in quantity,have been completed,
with the State Engineer having, as a result, been overruled.
To void obvious confusion, as has been created in this
case by 4 premature filing of applications in adjudication pro-
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ceedings, it would seem that (since the . priorty date goes back
to the first step in adjudication proceedings and would not be
affected by waiting to file the application, or a filing of the
application without a setting for hearing), the legislative intent
in construing the two Acts together should be, that an application
for adjudication should not be filed until a permit for a well
has been issued by the State Engineer, or denied and the appellate
procedures resulting therefrom, with a reversal, has been cam-
plated. However, if it clearly appears that the priority date
for a particular calendar year may be lost, then the application
could be filed and no hearing set until the State Engineer has
acted and appellate procedures are concluded. 	 .
Again, this Court is not unaware of the fact that some
Water Judges have permitted this to occur, and have treated the
permit problems somewhat in the nature of an appellate procedure,
but such past action is not considered as being precedent for
continuing error.
The application does not constitute the first "step"
in establishing a priority date. It is only common sense that
the application await the final determination of the State
Engineer's action before being filed or set for hearing.
The foregoing are the original questions submitted by
the Supreme Court and the determination thereof. On a later date
this Court requested, at the instance of some of the parties, the
right to consider certain rephrased supplemental or additional
questions, and the Supreme Court, by Supplemental Order, authorized
the Special Water Judge to consider those additional questions
"in his discretion."
As to such of those questions as are contained in the
Supplemental Order which the Special Water Judge intends to address,
determination will be made by the appropriate ruling to the
representative application in the various classes of claims prepared






Class 1 - Underground reservoirs.
Representative case: W-3971, Water Division 3.
Applicant: Bluepond Associates.
Bluepond Associates, one of the group referred to by
the Supreme Court in its decision as the joint venturers, filed
application for the adjudication of 72 underground storage rights
involving tributary water. The venturers took the position that
since this was tributary water, the Special Water Judge was not
authorized to consider the same. However, the Supreme Court had
specifically listed these applications by number in referring the
matter to the Special Water Judge and, with regard to tributary
water, stated that if it was found that any claim was solely
tributary water and if the Special Water Judge should find that
such transfer would not prejudice any rights, then the Special
Water judge may transfer the claim back to the Water Judge of the
division for hearing and disposition.
Under this latter provision, it is the position of the
Special Water Judge that these particular claims for storage
rights, although involving only tributary water, would prejudice
other water rights and therefore jurisdiction to continue to
consider the same was retained.
Each of these applications requests a decree for under-
ground water storage where a naturally occurring glacial terminal
moraine creates an underground dam. Each of the locations of the
alleged storage capacity behind this glacial terminal moraine lies
directly under a surface flowing river or stream.
In briefs and argument, the proponents of these projects
specifically advised the Court as to what their evidence would
show concerning methods of operation for the proposed storage
right. These are shown in the form of drawings labeled as Appendixes
A, B, and C, attached to the Reply Brief of the Joint Venturers.
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Without the argument and exhibits, affidavits might have been
necessary. (See copies of exhibits attached to this opinion.)
Explanation in argument and evidence by exhibit was
offered to show that at present, beneath the flowing surface
stream, these underground reservoirs were. full of water and that
the applicants proposed to pump through shallow wells, or withdraw
by french drains, water presently being held there. The water
withdrawn was to be released to the stream, thereby creating empty
storage capacity in the glacial moraine.
Applicants proposed to obtain a storage decree permitting
them to refill under such decree from the surface stream, by some
type of recharge operation, the capacity of the decree, would be
determined by the capacity created through the initial pumping
out and release of the water to the stream. In every case the over-lying
river or stream is named as the source of water for the storage
rights. Also no consideration of effect on, or loss to, existing
rights by the original withdrawal and release was indicated.
These drawinits of the operations and the argument
presented, it seems to the Court, raise the authorized supplemental
question as to whether one can obtain a decree to store in an
underground reservoir created by impounding water behind a naturally
occurring glacial terminal moraine, and the modified question of
whether tributary waters can be appropriated for use by persons
other than the claimants, or those whom the claimant is authorized
to represent, which was one of the original questions as to non-
tributary water.
It requires little study of • he claimant's briefs and
exhibits to see, that at present the surface river or stream is
riding on the existing water in storage, which actually is
admittedly also moving to a small degree, or amount, into the surface
stream, through the lower part of the terminal moraine. This factual
situation is no different, as a practical matter, than the de-
scription'of the alluvial flow of the Platte River contained in
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Kuioer, et al., v. Well Owners Conservation District, 176 Colo.
119, on page 132, 490 P2d 268, where the Honorable Mr. Justice
Groves states:
"In other words, the flow in the aquifer is both
downstream and toward the stream. As mentioned in
Fellhauer, the surface flow to the river rides
piggyback on the subsurface flow. It follows
that any withdrawal of groundwater will have some
effect on the stream." (Quoting from Fellhauer.)
Here it is perfectly obvious that the initial withdrawal
of water to create capacity in the reported underground reservoir,
and subsequent recharge from the stream itself, will have an affect
on the stream flow, and, of necessity, an affect upon existing
decreed appropriations.
It is inconceivable, and beyond the realm of practicality,
that the applicants would ever be able to control depletion of
the surface stream by infiltration of water, into a vacant capacity
immediately under the stream bed for recharge, at only the times
the State Engineer should determine that storage decrees be exercised.
Although the applicants argue vociferously that they
would fill in accordance with the appropriation date, thereby
avoiding injury to others, by release from the reservoir to satisfy
earlier claims, it is almost axiomatic that as release takes place
additional refill will automatically occur and will came from the
surface stream.
It is further inconceivable to the Court, that the
applicants could intend, or that it would be financially feasible,
to seal by concrete, or some other method, the entire bed of
the stream from the location of the dam to the headwaters of the
stream, with the proper types of openings in the bottom to control
the time when refill from the stream would take place. Since the
points in the surface flow from which the present water comes to
keep the glacial moraine full at this time, cannot be determined,
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there simply is not any method, in this Court's point of view,
that filling in accordance with the priority date of a storage
right could be controlled. Nor is there any way in which water
could be brought from another source, and be placed in the stream
without creating some adverse affect on other appropriators and
depletion of the surface stream above.
The application makes no reference to filling the
demands of downstream senior appropriators through waters from
any other source than the river which rides on the aquifer. But
even if such should be anticipated, it could not eliminate the
adverse affect on those direct flow decrees upstream from the
proposed area of storage.
This ruling is not to be interpreted as stating that
water cannot be stored behind a naturally occurring glacial termi-
nal moraine at some off-stream site and where recharge might
have occurred through normal precipitation on the land and the
water is, in effect, at present non-tributary and the intent is
to withdraw therefrom and refill with decreed water, either storage
or direct flow, from some other source. That type of issue is not
before the Court.
The application also recites proposed beneficial uses
in the broadest of general ways without the location of such use.
For example, for domestic, commercial, and irrigation purposes,
municipal purposes, or industrial purposes. The quantities of
water claimed are vast in magnitude and, from the face of the
applications themselves and exhibits submitted to the Court,
the claims appdar to be purely speculative, made for purposes
of profit and not for purposes of true and actual beneficial use.
The Court agrees with the position of some of the objectors that
this is a very thinly veiled attempt to obtain a direct flow right
under the guise, or disguise, of a storage right.
As a consequence, the Court is of the opinion that
treating the application, coupled with the argument and exhibits
-18-
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submitted, in the nature of a motion to dismiss or summary judgment
can and does result in the Court finding that these claims are
without merit and should be dismissed.
It, therefore, is the Order of the Court that all claims
of Bluepond Associates in Water Divisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
seeking underground storage rights beneath the channels of flowing
streams, being the cases as follows:
Division 1, W-9525 through W-9533, inclusive.
Division 2, W-4829 through W-4832, inclusive.
Division 3, W-3971.
Division 4, W-3556 through W-3571, inclusive, and W-2582.
Division 5, W-3962 through W-3981, inclusive.
Division 6, W-1511 through W-1526, inclusive.
Division 7, W-1899 through W-1904, inclusive.
be and they are hereby dismissed. The Court finds no just reason
for delay and this dismissal shall be considered final pursuant
to Rule 54(b), CRC?, Volume 7-A, CRS 1973.
Class 2 - Well Field Projects.
Representative case: W-4820, Water Division 2.
Applicant: Elk Creek Ventures.
This class consists of applications for underground
water rights by Elk Creek Ventures, described as the Las Animas-
Cheyenne-Arkansas Project, for the construction of wells, as
described in the application, to be physically "interconnected"
into an integrated system and is for the withdrawal of allegedly
non-tributary water.
The questions applicable to this group of applications
are all five of the original questions propounded by the Supreme
Court and perhaps certain of the supplemental questions. By
virtue of the determination of the answers to the original questions
submitted, this Court sees no necessity of addressing the supplemental
questions-in connection with these claims.
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The applications describe physical field surveys, which
do nothing more than pinpoint the location of the proposed well,
with no mention of ownership of the real property upon which the
same is located; contain a general allegation of non-tributary
character of the groundwater involved; recite "immediate application
to beneficial use, and/or for storage and subsequent application
to beneficial use, as well as reuse, successive use, disposition,
substitution, and exchange within the particular river basin
involved."
•
The application also has attached, as do the other joint
venture claims, a paper recital of intent to appropriate and
specifically reciting that well construction permits, or evidence
of denial thereof by the State Engineer, or evidence of his failure
to grant or deny, are to be submitted to the Water Court prior to
the entry of any decision, ruling, or order granting a water right.
This presumably refers to 37-92-302(2), CRS 1973.
This Court in ruling on the general questions has indicated
that in the interests of orderly procedure, the application for
well permits should be made to the State Engineer prior to
application for adjudication and any appeal from his action thereon
should be taken to the District Court of the county where the
proposed well is to be located, under the provisions of 37-90-115,
CRS 1973, as amended, and a determination made in such appeal
before any adjudication process. This Court reiterates its ruling
that the intention of the legislative acts and of the Legislature,
by the recital of standards in 37-92-205, CRS 1973, "The Water
Right Determination and Administration Act" is in no way an intent
to create an appellate procedure by the mere words "may grant a
conditional decree unless a denial of such permit was justified."
This Court again interprets the meaning of those words
as being that the justification must either be found to exist or
reversed by the proper court; namely, the District Court of the
county where the well is to be located.
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Also, in the absence of ownership of the land where the
well is to be located, the consent of the owner to construct a
well thereon, is a prerequisite, the eminent domain statutes
and the Constitution give no right of condemnation of well sites
to private parties. All this is explained in the answers to the
original questions submitted, principally Question No. 3.
These applications are considered by the Court to be
speculative under the Bunger case, supra, the Vidler case, supra,
and other cases, and are clearly for the purpose of profit, rather
than application to beneficial use by the applicant.
Consequently, as a matter of law, assuming all of the
allegations of the application could be proven, the applicant
would still not be entitled to a water right.
These cases, specifically in Division 1, case No. W-9518,
W-9519, W-9520, W-9523, W-9524, W .-9505, and W-9506, in Division 2
cases Nos. W-4810 through W-4828, inclusive, are hereby Ordered
dismissed in this instance however, without prejudice, with the
right to renew following completion of applications for well permits
or appellate procedures thereon, and the obtaining of the necessary
landowner consent, or ownership of the land involved for the well
site. The Court finds no just reason for delay and this dismissal
shall be considered final pursuant to Rule 54(b), CRC?, Volume
7-A, CRS 1973.
Class 3 - Ground Water Infiltration Projects
Water Division 1.
Applicant: Central Metropolitan Water Users,
These applications, total nine in number, all in
Water Division 1, and were filed by Central Metropolitan Water
Users, another of the same joint ventures, claiming both tributary
and/or non-tributary groundwater. The groundwater alleged in the
application is a product of infiltration into sewage lines, col-
lectors, end other buried pipes, lines and conduits presently
used for wastewater and sewage.
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With regard to the claim of such water as may be tributary,
the cases are legion ever since Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244,
133 P 1107, (and no other citation of authority is necessary),
to the effect that underground water percolating, seeping, or
traveling to the river, is tributary thereto, and constitutes a
part of the river, subject to the claims of the appropriators thereon.
Any direct flow decrees which might be awarded for such tributary
water would, of necessity, have co be junior and inferior to all
existing priorities as of the date of entry of the new decree.
As to the non-tributary water and the de minimis tributary
groundwater to which claim is also made, the application clearly
states concerning both, that the water would never flow naturally
to the stream, or it would never reach the stream naturally in
less than 100 years, if it were not for the fact of its infiltration
and transportation by the pipes and so forth hereinbefore described.
If in fact such pipes are at a depth sufficiently far
underground to intercept non-tributary or de minimis tributary
water, which again is somewhat inconceivable to this Court, or is
non-tributary, or trans-basin water returning through sewers to
the stream, then, pursuant to existing case authority, such water
would be developed water, constituting new water into the basin or
stream. It would be created by those who installed the pipes, lines,
or conduits, and under case authority, one who does not contribute
to the cost of, or contribute in some way to, such development has
no right to claim the water developed thereby. It has been un-
equivocally held that the party responsible for the development of
water has the first right thereto, and recapture and reuse thereof.
Denver v. Shultan, 179 Colo. 47 $06 P2d 144 and prior cases.
It is true, as first discussed in Brighton Ditch Company 
v. Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, at page 377, that appropriators
downstream may not force a developer of new water into the stream,
(in that case trans-basin water), to continue to provide such
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water either from development of non-tributary water, de minimis 
tributary water, or transmountain diversion of water from one basin
to another, and that the appropriators an the stream to which this
new water is added, have no vested right to a continuation of
such new water. Nevertheless, as long as the developer actually
does continue to develop and provide such water and fails himself
to recapture it for his use, as he is permitted to do (Denver v.
Fulton Ditch Company, supra) then the water has left his possession
and control, is abandoned and is traveling to the surface stream,
it has thus become become a part thereof as to all others than the
developer, and is subject to use by the existing appropriators on
the stream and it may notbe claimed by some far junior new-comer
free of river call.
Since this is the basis of these claims by Central
Metropolitan Water Users (namely, Division 1, cases W-9508 through
W-9516), to be free of river call, it is conclusive on the face
of the application alone, if everything stated therein is proven
and the applicant sustains his burden of proof, still, as a matter
of law, the applicant is not entitled to the type of decree sought,
for total consumption of water developed by others by use, reuse,
successive use, and disposal thereof, or for exchange or
substitution.
The foregoing applications are, therefore, Ordered
dismissed. The Court finds no just reason for delay and this
dismissal shall be considered final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Volume
7-A, CRS 1973.
Class 4 - Denver Basin Projects.
Water Division 1
Applicant: Central Metropolitan Water Users.
The applicant here is also the Central Metropolitan




The application requests adjudication of non-tributary
water from "unconsuned withdrawals, return flows, and/or waste-
water from certain described existing wells presently withdrawing
non-tributary groundwater, plus certain described wells to be
constructed by applicants to divert and recapture such unconsumed
withdrawals, return flow, and/or wastewater which allegedly enter
non-tributary formations within the Denver Basin."
The Reply Brief of the applicant-joint ventures contains
argument and an Appendix F, the latter of which illustrates the
proposal. Apparently the proposal is to capture alleged unconsumed
withdrawals, return flow, and wastewater from existing wells,
and new wells to be constructed, into an "integrated" system an
the theory that after application to beneficial use on the surface
the uncansumed water or return flow and waste water travels back
down to the non-tributary original location from which it was
originally withdrawn by either the existing wells or wells to be
constructed. The maze of pipelines, and number of real property
rights-of-way involving eminent domain proceedings, required is
beyond imagination.
When this theory was argued, it was pointed out that
if water withdrawn was non-tributary, there must be some sort of
an impermeable layer of material between the surface and the non-
tributary water. To this argument (and the same situation in
Class 5 hereinafter discussed), the joint ventures responded that
there was in fact such an impermeable material, as shown on Appendix
F, Reply Brief of Joint Ventures (attached hereto), but that the
return water perched an top of this impermeable layer, from whence
it would be taken by the recovery wells.
Assuming that the applicant's proof would apply solely
to wells constructed by the applicant and such wells are producing
non-tributary water or de minimis tributary water, then such water
would be developed water, with the applicant as the developer.
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It would constitute new water into the stream basin, and if the
developer could do so, under Denver v. Fulton, supra, they perhaps
would be entitled to recapture and reuse to extinction.
On the other hand, if this is non-tributary or de minimis 
non-tributary groundwater developed by existing wells and the
developers thereof have not sought to recapture and reuse return
flow or waste from their development, then while the appropriators
on the stream may not insist that they continued to punp and provide
such water, such appropriators have, while it is being provided,
the first right to the same in the stream and it may not be inter-
cepted by some later junior appropriator, such as Applicant, free
from the call of the river. It is tributary at that point in
time, subject only to discontinuance by the developer or use
or reuse by the developer alone.
As a matter of law, the applicants are not entitled to
any uncansumed withdrawal, return flow, or waste water from
existing wells constructed by othemsbringing new water into the
basin. In addition, as a matter of law, the applicants, as private
parties, as previously pointed out in this opinion, lack any
capacity under existing statutes to enter upon the lands of the
well owners for either the purpose of constructing new wells or
attempting to intercept waste or return flows from the existing
wells.
In point of fact, if the water perching on the impermeable
layer includes both water developed by the applicants, and water
from other developers, there would seem to be no way in which one
type of water could be distinguished from the other, and no way
in which the quantity of unconsumed withdrawal, return flow, and
waste water from the apnlicants' developed water could be deter-
mined, as opposed to such water developed by others, and, as a




In addition, as to both this Class 4 and subsequent
Class 5, with reference to existing wells, there has been no physical
demonstration an the land of the owners of existing wells to give
notice to others of intent to appropriate, as required by Central 
Colorado Water Conservancy District v. City and County of Denver,
189 Colo. 272, at page 275, 539 P2d 1270. To integrate some
2,333 wells into one system and to claim 246,160 acre feet a year
surpasses the absurd.
As to the claim for unconsumed withdrawals, return flows,
and/or waste water from water actually developed by the applicant 
from non-tributary or de minimis non-tributary sources, the
application may proceed, with the onus being on the Water Judge
to determine the quantity which can be validly reclaimed and
reused from water developed by only the applicant. All claims
based on existing wells are dismissed.
In addition, the Court would point out that under these
applications there is an attempted claim by the applicant to a
right to return flow from sewage disposal plants and power plants,
as well as from existing constructed wells, and as to this claim
it is clear to the Court that such water is enroute to the surface
stream, is tributary thereto, and is considered a part thereof.
These claims are dismissed.
The Court finds no just reason for delay and this dis-
missal shall be considered final pursuant to Rule 54(b), CRC?,
Volume 7-A, CRS 1973.
Class 5 - Denver Basin Recharge Project.
Case W-9537-78, Water Division 1.
Applicant: Central Metropolitan Water Users.
The applicant is again Central Metropolitan Water Users
and the claim is for unconsumed withdrawals, return flow, and/or
waste water from existing wells, together with wells to be
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constructed by the applicant, to withdraw, divert, or recapture
the foregoing water.
The Court here incorporates all of its comments concern-
ing Class 4, relative to existing wells and rights to developed
water:
In addition, however, the Court refers to Appendix E,
attached to Joint Ventures Reply Brief and hereto attached, where
once again the perched aquifer above the impermeable shale, which
enclosed the non-tributary aquifer, is shown. In this diagram,
however, there is one distinguishing feature from Appendix F,
Denver Basin Recharge Plan, namely Appendix E shows the bed of
the river to be adjacent to, and in elevation above, the area
where this returning water will supposedly perch.
Assuming, arauendo, that the area exists, and from the
impermeable shale to the surface, the ground is not impermeable,
then it would appear to this Court that seepage from the river
would long since have filled the area where the applicants claim
there is space for return flow from the surface to perch. The
drawing Appendix E clearly demonstrates this fact.
The Court reiterates, that these applicants have no
rights whatever to the existing wells, or return flow therefrom,
no rights of eminent domain with regard thereto, particularly as
to the personal property involved in the existing rights, and
no right to use said existing wells in conjunction, or in partner-
ship, with the present owners, as in the case of a headgate and
ditch, which in effect applicants are attempting, by calling such
existing wells an alternate point of diversion for the applicant,.
(paragraph 3(c) of the application), and in addition referring to
the whole as an "integrated" system.
The proposed beneficial use is obviously a recitation
of general purposes without any actual beneficial use known to
exist or intended. No power of eminent domain for a "right-of-way"
exists to the presently existing wells, since the applicant is not
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an "owner" of a water right seeking to transport it from one point
to another across the land of another party, as is stated in answers
to the general questions. In addition, in this application, the
only field work to which a priority date could be attached appears
co be merely a survey of the location of an existing well from the
State Engineer's Records or a survey of one point in which a well
is to be drilled, one of which points is located in the middle of
a publically dedicated street right-of-way. The entire plan and
program of the applications appear once again to be clearly for
profit, rather than actual beneficial use, by the applicant,
either itself, or by contract, or need of others, Stinger, supra,
and Vidler, supra.
It is repeated that as to existing wells there has been
no open demonstration on the land where the wells are located to
give any notice of intent to appropriate. Central Colorado v. 
Denver, supra.
In the Court's opinion, these applications (being cases
W-9494, W-9495, W-9497, W-9498 through W-9503, inclusive) should
be, and are hereby dismissed. The Court finds no just reason for
delay and this dismissal shall be considered final pursuant to
Rule 54(b), CRCP, Volume 7-A, CRS 1973.
In Classes 4 and 5 the claims are so preposterous that
evidence is not necessary to support dismissal.
Class 6
Representative case: W-4805, Water Division 2
Applicant: Bob Johnston
This is one application in Water Division 2, case No.
W-4805, requesting adjudication for 53 wells, to be integrated
together as one system, claiming "All of the water lying below
Applicant's land contained in the Dakota, Cheyenne, and Morrison
aquifers." The application contains a general allegation that
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the applicant intends to construct additional wells as alternate
points of diversion, as may be required to recover full productive
yields from the three aquifers.
The application further alleged beneficial uses by
"immediate application" for domestic, industrial, commercial,
irrigation, fire protection, stock watering, recreational, fish
and wildlife, and any other beneficial purpose. In addition, it
mentions storage and subsequent application of said uses, for
exchange purposes, for replacement of depletion, and other
augmentation purposes.
As a generality, it is described as a "unified municipal
water supply system." This could not be immediate.
All of the previous findings and rulings of this Court
with regard to right to apply for adjudication, and applications
for permits to the State Engineer apply to this case, except that
the applicant alleged ownership of all of the land, which for
purposes of a motion to dismiss the Court must assume can be proven.
The quantity claimed is again of a huge magnitude,
namely, 71 CFS, allegedly yielding a total of 51,430 acre feet
per year. It is completely obvious from the argument of counsel
for the applicant, and the briefs submitted in his behalf, that
none of the proposed beneficial uses, with the possible exception
of irrigation, or stock watering, on his own land, presently
exist. Or that there is even any demand in any location for the
other uses, particularly for a "municipal" system.
Under these circumstances, the Court cannot assume that
the applicant will be able to prove immediate application, as
alleged, to beneficial use of the quantity claimed, even assuming
all wells should be immediately drilled, rather than construction
being delayed over a long extended period of years.
It would appear that this is an attempt again to become
the owner of a conditional decree to a vast quantity of water,
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alleeedly non-tributary in nature, over an extended period of years,
thus totally excluding subsequent developers who might become
owners of portions of the land, or might desire to utilize water
from the land, having the consent of the then owner thereof to do
so, from appropriating water which is lying dormant beneath the
surface. The conditional decree could be kept alive with a very
minimal amount of diligence, for an interminable number of years.
It was most interesting to the Court that in argument,
and brief, counsel for Mr. Johnston stated that by virtue of certain
filings made in December, 1979, which never came to fruition, by
Mr. Huston, one of the joint venturers in this proceeding, because
of such former applications, his actions in this application are
not only taken in an attempt to protect, preserve, and develop
for use the non-tributary water under his land, but "also to
protect himself against the claiss,of Huston." Self protection
is not proper intent to appropriate and apply to beneficial use,
to the contrary, it is hoarding water.
This being the case, the Applicant admits in effect
that he does not at this time, while intending to try to appropriate,
know of any beneficial use needs presently existing for this water,
other than as previously stated, perhaps irrigation and stock
watering on his awn land.
Even the doctrine of maximum use could not possibly
justify a conditional decree solely for the purpose of protecting
water resources against the claims of others, nOr justify such a
clearly speculative profit-making venture.
This Court has previously ruled that well applications
should first be made, then applications for adjudication filed
to protect a priority date within the year of filing, but should
never be set for hearing pending final action of the State Engineer,
and of the proper appellate court with regard to the well permit
requests.
,While this Court does not subscribe entirely to the
outright ownership "in fee" of the surface owners in the non-
tributary groundwaters underlying his property, as argued by the
opponent and concurred in by Johnston, relying upon Whitten v. Colt
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153 Colo. 157, 385 P2d 131, this Court has indicated that the
construction of wells requires ownership of the land where construction
is to take place, or consent of the owner of that land. The Special
Water Judge has the highest admiration and respect for Mr. William
R. Kelly frcramany years of acquaintance and association, and
while the Whitten v. Coit case, supra, adopts with approval his
language, that language states that the landowner has "property"
in the water in his soil which is a vested right, but goes'on to
state that it is subject to the Reasonable Use Doctrine and Mr.
Kelly does not state that it is "fee ownership." Hence, this
Court departs in its ruling from adoption of the principle that
there is such a "fee" ownership in non-tributary water underlying
an owner's property.
By virtue of the need of the ownership, or consent of
the owner to develop non-tributary water, it is obvious that the
ruling of this Court does find that the landowner has the first
right of development as to non-tributary waters underlying his
property, and the same may be developed by others only with his
consent. That consent must include the right to construct the
necessary structures, as well as the right to use the water
therefrom.
As to this application, it is the opinion of the Court
that the claims of beneficial use in excess of that necessary
for irrigation or stock watering, on the applicant's land could
not be brought into existence for years, and years, and years,
and the application as to such fanticized uses should be and.
therefore, is dismissed, it being provided that the application should
by the Supreme Court be referred back to the Water Court in Water
Division 2, assuming well permit requests have been made by the
time it is remanded, for adjudication and determination by the
Water Judge, as to the quantity of water that can be sustained
as necessary for beneficial use on the lands of the applicant
for irrigation and stock watering purposes.
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The dismissal of the balance of the application is
based upon its purely speculative nature, its obvious intention
to be for profit rather than beneficial use, and the admission
that the application was so framed, and filed, purely to cry to
protect the underground water from the claim of others.
The Court finds no just reason for delay and the dis-
missal as co the major portion of the claim shall be considered
final, pursuant to Rule 54.(b), CRCP, Volume 7-A, CRS 1973.
Class 7
Representative case No. W-1905, Water Division 7
Applicant: Colorado-Pacific-Aztec
The applicant here has filed two applications, W-1905
and W-1906, in Water Division 7 and W-1905 has been selected as
representative of the class. The applicant is described as
"Colorado-Pacific-Aztec," without an indication of whether this is
a tradename, a corporation, or what type of entity it actually is.
It seems, however, that it is neither a municipality nor an
organization quasi-municipal in nature.
The application seeks adjudication of 56 wells, but
in a most unusual approach. It first seeks 56 wells 300 feet in
depth, involving tributary water, but then in the same identical 
location of the first 56, seeks a second 56 wells of a depth of
1,300 feet, claiming to tap non-tributary water by virtue of
the depth.
The application further states, and the Court must
assume it can be proven, that the consent of all surface owners
where well sites are to be located has been obtained.
The total amount of water claimed is stated in gallons
per minute, it involves 1,485 gallons per minute of tributary
water and 9,837 gallons per minute of non-tributary water. These
claims, once again, are for a vast quantity of water, and no ex-
planation is made as to how you draw from the same well in measuiable
quantities both tributary and non-tributary water at different
depths. It would seem obvious, that drawing water from both
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sources through the same well opening would make any determination
of whether the water produced was tributary, or non-tributary,
infeasible, and perhaps impossible.
The proposed beneficial uses are again very indefinite
in nature, but do in general, state the location of the use as
being "within Water Division No. 7". This general location con-
ceivably might be adequate under the Taussig case, supra, if the
claim being made were not for such an enormous quantity. The
applicant does not state that the applicant itself, whatever it
is, will apply the water to the proposed beneficial uses and the
Court finds the following inconsistencies in the named proposed
uses (paragraph 8 of the Application.)
The proposed uses include "agriculture," and yet in
paragraph 10, where the number of acres proposed to be irrigated
is to be set forth, the applicant states that this is "undetermined."
This is speculation.
Further, a beneficial use is claimed for "dust control."
In reading all of the cases back to Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch,
supra, the Court has found no instance where such a use has been
found to be a beneficial use.
Next, there is a claim of beneficial use for "land
reclamation," which has not heretofore received approval as proper
beneficial use. "Cooling," of course, would normally be a 100
percent consumptive use, which the applicant might have the right
to achieve as to non-tributary water, the same being developed
water, but under applicable law would have no such right as co
tributary water without depletion of the stream, to the injury
of other appropriators.
Finally, the proposed uses include "slurry pipelines."
The Court is aware of the present and past statutes of Colorado,
first holding that no water may be appropriated for use outside
the boundaries of the State of Colorado, later amended to include
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use outside, with those Compact states willing to give Compact
credit for water delivered through slurry pipelines. This Court
holds, however, that in view of the amended statutes, the Water
Court is without jurisdiction to enter conditional or other decrees
concerning water for such use, until all preliminary action regard-
ing the Compact, and the compact state involved, have been completed.
If the applicant does not intend to proceed under the 1979 amend-
Sent, 37-81-101, CRS 1973, as Amended, then use outside of the state
under the preceding Acts, 37-81-101 (formerly 148-1-1, CRS 1963),
for slurry pipelines to carry solids beyond the state line is
totally prohibited. No claim is made by Colorado-Pacific, other than
the general claim of use within Water Division No. 7, that there
is need existant at this time within that District for use of water
for slurry pipeline purposes.
In the opinion of this Court, the application should
be remanded back by the Supreme Court to the Water Judge in Water
Division 7, for proper adjudication as to claim for tributary water,
again assuming that by time of remand applications have been made
to the State Engineer for well permits, which appears to have been
already done by the allegations of the claim, and subject co the
restrictions found by this Court to exist regarding action of the
State Engineer and appellate review thereof.
This Court does find, however, that "dust control" may
not be considered a beneficial use, and leaves to the determina-
tion of the Water Judge the question of whether cooling, and slurry
pipelines may constitute beneficial uses. This Court points out
that utility companies and municipalities have applied water for
cooling purposes and it may very well be that this is a proper
beneficial use. By no stretch of the imagination is there such
a beneficial use as "land reclamation."
As to the non-tributary water, the same may be
appropriated as heretofore set forth in this ruling as to other
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claims, but in remand to the Water Judge the same should occur
only under the caveat, that proof must be made chat such water can
be distinguished from the tributary water, for measurement purposes,
and that Colorado-Pacific-Aztec must prove to the satisfaction of
the Water Judge that beneficial use is actually going to take
place, and further that this application is not solely for profit-
making purposes, rather than under a true intention to apply it to
beneficial use. Further under an additional caveat that reduction
in quantity claimed. may, as a result of evidence presented,
indicate that the amounts should be severely cut back.
Class - Nedlog
Representative case:. W-4004, Water Division 5
Applicant: Nedlog Technology Group
The representative application selected is case No.
W-4004, as amended, in Water Division No. 5. The applicant
is Nedlog Technology Group, without specification of whether this
is a tradename, corporation, or other type of entity, but
again it is apparently not municipal or quasi-municipal in
nature.
Just prior to briefing and the argument before the
Special Water Judge, the applicant withdrew its claims to "all"
of the water in the Burns Basin, allegedly constituting some
twenty million acre feet, and withdrew any claim for an under-
ground storage refill right to store and withdraw 20,000 acre feet
annually of "refill" water into the Burns Basin.
The applicant maintains its application as co the
seeking of a decree for withdrawal through wells of 200,000 acre
feet annually from the Burns Basin, plus 20,000 acre feet annually
of what the applicant refers. to as "lost water" from said basin.
The applicant alleged that the subject water is part
of a natural stream, but that stream is not tributary to, or
-35-
G105
hydraulically connected with any surface stream, alluvial aquifer,
or other water, so as to influence the rate, or direction of
movement of any such surface stream or alluvial aquifer. This
presupposes that the entire Burns Basin extending over several
counties, is an impervious bowl with a lower lip, over which water
spills at the rate of 20,000 acre feet annually. Assuming this fore-
going can all be proven, which is doubtful, it is very clear that
there must, a fortiori, be an annual refill to the basin of 20,000
acre feet per year. This recharge must come from some surface
source. The applicant claims that the water produced through its
wells will be "developed" water and, therefore, new water into the
surface streams. Applicant therefore claims the right to reuse,
and successive use, or other disposition,free from any limitation,
restriction, or requirement as to place of use, amount of discharge,
or location or discharge following initial use, reuse, or successive
use. Presumably it is intended to claim a right of use to extinc-
tion.
The area for the proposed use is "all lands susceotible 
of being served directly or by exchange," (emphasis added) without
any limitation as to location whatever. Further, a claim is made
to apply to beneficial use beyond the boundaries of the State of
Colorado. As to the latter, this Court has previously pointed out)
such use is either totally prohibited or, if the applicant intends
to proceed under the 1979 amendment, is subject to use in Compact
states which are willing to give credit to Colorado under its
Compact commitments for water delivered into that state.
In the event the Water Judge in Water Divisions 5 and 6
were to have jurisdiction of this matter, it is the finding of
this Court, as stated heretofore, that all action necessary under
the 1979 amendment would have to be completed before the Water
Court would have jurisdiction to proceed. If the applicant's
intention is not to proceed under the 1979 amendment, then this
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portion of the claim for use outside the state is prohibited
and should be dismissed.
Interestingly enough, the application itself is so
general in nature as to assume that the applicant would have the
authority, or obtain the right to use the Adams .Tunnel, a Federal
facility, the Moffat Tunnel, and delivery systems belonging to
others, but does not claim as in Taussig, supra, having negotiated
for use of these systems.
Further, the applicant is relying upon certain prior
obtained agreements from landowners, examples of which were submitted
to the Special Water Judge, in which the contract or agreement
specifically and unequivocally states that the landowner and the
applicant Nedlog are to share in the pecuniary profits.
The proposed uses contain reference to uses which have
never been determined as beneficial in nature, such as stream
flow enhancement, and the entire application is so general in
nature that it cannot be defined otherwise, than as pure
speculation.
The applicant also complained in argument, of prior
arbitrary actions of the State Engineer concerning well permits
applied for, and requests the Water Judge to "require" the State
Engineer to issue and review well permits for the applicant. As
to any wells presently in existence or those subsequently drilled,
this Court has ruled that where the State Engineer has denied in
whole, or in part, any permit, appellate review must be to the
District Court in the county of location, rather than to the
Water Court, and following completion of such appeal the Water
Court then may be in a position, as a result, to make a finding
that the denial of a permit was justified under 37-90-137, CRS 1973,
but not make such determination in an appellate capacity.
The applicant further admits, in the application itself,
chat the project and expenses associated therewith is of such a
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"magnitude" (pages 14 and 15, Application) that it would be phased
over several years. As has been previously ruled by this Court,
no prospective appropriator should be permitted by the obtaining
of a conditional decree, to require later appropriators to pay
tribute to fulfill their needs, assuming they are able to make
appropriations by well in accordance with the determinations set
forth in this opinion.
This application is very similar to those in the Bunger 
case, supra, and the Vidler case, supra. It is so broad and general
in nature as to be totally infeasible as an entire project.
It is the ruling of this Court that this application
should be and is dismissed, in this instance, however, without
prejudice to the applicant to file a new application in the Water
Court. complying with the terms of this opinion for a realistic
quantity of water based upon proper and adequate proof of applica-
tion of said water to beneficial use within a reasonable time,
rather than profit, and stating the nature of the beneficial use
and the locations where such use is to occur.
PART III 
CONCLUSIONARY MATTERS 
A.	 As stated earlier in this ruling, at the instance of
some of the parties, the Special Water Judge requested from the
Supreme Court the right in his discretion, to consider certain
rephrased supplemental, or additional and subordinate questions.
By Supplemental Order, dated August 29 ., 1979, the Supreme Court
granted the request and added seven supplemental questions.
Some of these have been in effect answered in the
rulings on the first five questions and the claims involved. The
others, the Special Water Judge in his discretion does not consider
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essential to the rulings herein made and some, such as Supplemental
Question No. 5, involve a claim or portion of a claim which has
been withdrawn. In the light of the ruling of the Court concerning
the fact that non-tributary groundwater outside the boundaries of
a designated basin is subject to appropriation and setting forth
authority therefor, there is no necessity to take up the
constitutional question of whether or not the waters are appro-
priable under the Constitution. Nor did the Supreme Court initially,
even though requested by some of the parties, refer to the
Constitution in its question to the Special Water Judge. The ques-
tion was deliberately framed to exclude reference to the Constitution.
This Court does, however, declare that, in the opinion
of the Court, regardless of the semantical language used in the
applicable sections of the Constitution of the State of Colorado,
where it speaks of "natural streams," such language must be
interpreted in the light of the technical knowledge available at
the time of the drafting and adoption of the Constitution. It is
the opinion of this Court, that although the drafters were limited
in knowledge at that time, to perhaps surface flows, and shallow
well information, they, nevertheless, intended subjectively to
state that "all" of the waters in the State of Colorado, wherever
located, are to be protected by the Constitution, are the property
of the public, and dedicated to the use of the people of the state,
subject to legislative enactment prescribing methods of effecting
. appropriation, and providing, as they later did, for conditiohal
decrees, as well as absolute decrees following application to
beneficial use.
B.	 The United States of America is a party to this pro-
ceeding, having been made so by notice served in accordance with
the provisions of the McCarran Act, and by making a general appear-
ance, but it appears here in the role of an "objector" to the
claims before the Court. In making such objection, counsel for
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the United States reiterated the old theory of reservation of
waters, stating in arguments that all water underlying Federal
lands is the property of the United States.
This claim the Court specifically rejects. Since the
Desert- Land Act, and subsequent enactment ol Federal legislation,
in order to acquire water rights, the United Statesof America must
comply with state law and procedures. The large areas held by
the United States and denominated as National Forests and National
Parks do not in any way constitute reservations, as that term is
used in connection with power plant sites or Indian reservations,
where the United States has been somewhat successful in asserting
reservation of waters.
By simple pronouncement and argument, the United States
of America may not be permitted to substitute a rhetorical
"reservation" of waters for a conditional decree, as that is defined
and legally entered pursuant to the laws of the State of Colorado.
The United States may not withhold from the dedication to the
people of this state all this essential natural resource under
National Forests and Parks by mere language. It has no right
unless or until, it procures a conditional decree and/or final
decree in the courts of this state, for whatever beneficial use
it intends to make of those subsurface waters and for a fixed
quantity thereof.
This is, of course, not a specific issue before this
Court submitted by the Supreme Court of this state, nor is it
necessarily asserted as an issue, except in the form of an
objection, principally to the Nedlog claims of right to withdraw
from Under Federal lands by wells adjacent thereto. However,
this Court feels obligated to point out, that any argument of
reservation of waters over such an enormous expanse as the National
Forests and National Parks in the State of Colorado is being argued
-40-
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only as a substitute to try to assert ownership without decree
and, in lieu of coming into state courts and seeking conditional,
and final, decrees for beneficial purposes, as required by law.
All of the foregoing concludes the matters submitted
to the Special Water Judge for decision by the Supreme Court of
the State of Colorado and in accordance with its Order of April
16, 1979, the foregoing decisions as to cotton questions of law
and claims involved are certified to the Supreme urt.
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ATTACHMENT E
IN THE DISTRICT COUR
IN AND FOR WATER DIVISION NO. 1
STATE OF COLORADO
CASE NO. W-9192-78
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION )
FOR WATER RIGHTS OF	 )
)
HIGHLAND VENTURERS AND MISSION )
VIEJO COMPANY	 )	 CORREC
)	 FINDINGS OF FACT,
IN THE ARAPAHOE FORMATION AND	 )	 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
THE LARAMIE-FOX HILLS AQUIFER	 )
)
IN DOUGLAS COUNTY	 )
This matter was tried to the Court on November 5 through 8 and 14,
1979, December 12, 26 and 27, 1979, and February 29, 1980, upon applicant's
claims for conditional underground water rights from the Arapahoe Formation.
After considering the pleadings, the files herein, the evidence presented
at trial, and the written closing arguments submitted by the parties,
the Court entered on August 20, 1980 its Memorandum of Decision herein.
On September 10, 1980, the Court held a conference with the parties at
," which was discussed the form of the decree to be entered herein. On that
same date, the Court conducted a hearing at which applicant presented
evidence concerning proposed well locations and the question whether the
application should be republished due to changes in certain of the proposed
well locations. Consistent with the Court's Memorandum of Decision and
its orders entered herein at the conclusion of the hearing on
September 10, 1980, the Court enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The application herein for conditional underground water
rights from both the Arapahoe Formation and the Laramie-Fox Mills Aquifer
was filed on February. 28, 1978, notice of the application was given
according to law. Statements of opposition to the application were filed
on behalf of the State of Colorado, Department of Natural Resources;
Edward Russell Jaksch; Agnes Jaksch; Mildred Simons; McArthur Ranch Civic
Association and Surrey Ridge Homeowner's Association; Joy R. Hilliard, at
al., (Esther G. Smedley subsequently withdrew as a party in opposition);
and Willows Water District. Entries of appearance were filed on behalf of








Water and Sanitation District; :_z1; of Aurora; Colorado Memorial Parks,
Inc.; Consolidated Industries, Inc.; Anthony A. Jones, et al.; and Water
in Our wells an unincorporated association, the members of which include
those Listed in tie entry of appearance filed on behalf of Anthony A.
Jones, et al.;. The statements of opposition of McArthur Ranch Civic
Association, Mildred Simons, Agnes Jaksch and Edward Russell Jaksch were
subsequently withdrawn. The entries of appearance filed on behalf of the
Colorado memorial Parks, Inc., Consolidated Industries, Inc., and Goldsmith
Metropolitan Distrint (formerly listed as a member of Water in Our Wells)
were also withdrawn.
:. At the initial pretrial conference on May 1, 1979, Water
in Our Wells filed a motion, joined in by the State of Colorado, to
abate the 7-0-00 ^'ng e pending the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in original proceeding 79SA38 (Southeastern Water Conservancy District,
et al. v. John Huston, et .). The motion was denied. Applicant's motion
for separate trials and separate decrees with respect to applicant's
proposed wells inthe Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifer and the Arapahoe Formation
was ;ranted. The Court's pretrial order dated July 20, 1979, nunc Pro tunc 
June 20, 1379, provided for trial of the Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifer claims
on August 3.1. 1973, and trial of the Arapahoe Formation claims starting on
November f, 1375. The Court's d____ with respect to applicant's claims
for water in the 1,aramie-Fox Hills Aquifer was entered on October 30,
1979.
:. A second pretrial conference with respect to applicant's
claims and proposed wells in the Arapahoe Formation was held on September
:7, 1979. A second motion to abate the proceedings pending decision in
original proceedino 79SA32 was filed by the State of Colorado. The motion
was denied, and the State's ensuing petition for a writ in the nature of
prohibition was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court. At the second
pretrial conference, an appearance was entered on behalf of Richmond
Phipps for the first time in this proceeding. The Court's supplemental
pretrial order entered October 30, 1979, nunc oro tunc September 27, 1979,
required Richmond Phipps to file a statement of position setting forth her
position with respect to aoplicant's Arapahoe Formation claims. The




behalf of Richmond Phipps asserted that the Court did not have jurisdiction
to adjudicate applicant's claims prior to decision on her petition to set
aside the sale of the Highlands Ranch pending in Case No. P-4007, Douglas
County District Court. This assertion was treated as a motion to abate
the proceeding, and was heard and denied on October 30, 1979. Richmond
Phipps' petition for writ in the nature of prohibition followed, and was
denied by the Colorado Supreme Court. Her subsequent motion for permission
not to participate at trial was granted by this Court.
4. The parties that participated in the trial on applicant's
Arapahoe Formation claims were, in addition to applicant: the State of
Colorado, Water in Our Wells, Willows Water District, Western Water
Resources and Phipps 1527 Partnerships, and Stonybrooke Associates.
Pursuant to the Court's order at the conclusion of the trial, the parties
submitted written closing arguments. Applicant also submitted a written
reply closing argument in response to the closing arguments of the other
parties.
5. On December 18, 1979, Mission Viejo Company acquired all
interest of Highland Ventures in the decree on the Laramie-Fox Hills
Aquifer wells and claims, and in the application in this proceeding with
respect to the Arapahoe Formation claims and proposed wells. Mission
Viejo Company, therefore, is the sole applicant in this proceeding.
6. Applicant Mission Viejo Company owns 21,612 contiguous acres in !
Douglas County comprising most of what is known as the Highlands Ranch,
and claims the right to construct wells to divert and use water from the
Arapahoe Formation underlying the ranch. Applicant seeks in this
proceeding a decree confirming its right to use such water and
determining that the State Engineer is required to issue permits for
the wells it wants to construct for that purpose. The lands overlying the
portion of the Arapahoe Formation from which applicant seeks. to use such
water are described in Appendix 1 attached hereto, and are referred to
hereafter as the "Highlands Ranch." Applicant proposed to divert the
water through thirteen Arapahoe Formation wells to he constructed initially;
with additional wells to be constructed as necessary to maintain produc-
tion levels. The total amount of water claimed from the Arapahoe Formation
in the application filed herein was 11,640 acre-feet annually. This was




applications filed with the State Engineer's Office by applicant on
January 31, 1978. At trial, the total amount of water claimed in this
proceeding was reduced to 5,948 acre-feet. The application as originally
filed in this proceeding requested that each of the proposed wells be
designated as an alternate point of diversion, so that the total water
claimed could be produced through any combination of wells. At trial this
request was modified to limit overpumping of any one well to 125 percent
of its permitted and decreed capacity, subject to the 5,948 acre-feet
l imitation on total annual pumping.
7. Applicant's applications to the State Engineer's Office on
January 31, 1978, for permits to construct thirteen Arapahoe Formation
wells on the Highlands Ranch were initially denied on July 24, 1978. The
State Engineer's denial order included the finding that:
(T)he ground water would be produced
from the Arapahoe aquifer. The provi-
sion of subsection 37-90-137(4), C.R.S.
1973, will therefore apply to these
applications.
(This statute is often referred to as Senate Bill 213, and is referred to
hereafter as "S.B. 213".) The applications were denied because the State
Engineer was unable to find:
a. That unappropriated water is available for withdrawal by the
proposed wells in the amount requested by the applicant.
b. That the vested water rights of senior appropriators diverting
water from the Arapahoe aquifer would not be materially injured.
(Applicant's exh. 16).
At trial Water in.Ouz Wells, Western Water Resources and Phipps
1527 asserted that the applicant was bound by the State Engineer's denial
of its well permit applications because it failed to take an appeal to the
District Court pursuant to 37-90-115, C.R.S. 1973. Applicant contended
that the State Engineer had never finally denied the well permit appli-
cations.
This Court has jurisdiction to grant a conditional decree in the
face of either inaction or denial by the State Engineer. Accordingly,
the Court need not determine the finality of the State Engineer's actions.
8. Objector Willows Water District provides municipal water
service to approximately 10,000 people residing within its boundaries,





boundary of the Highlands Ranch. The primary source of supply for the
district's water system is thirteen Arapahoe Formation wells, five of
which are located within its boundaries near the north boundary of the
Highlands Ranch, and eight of which are located on the Highlands Ranch.
9. The Western Water Resources and Phipps 1527 Partnerships claim
to own seventy-five percent of the water produced by the eight Arapahoe
Formation wells on the Highlands Ranch that are used by the Willows Water
District. The Partnerships and the District entered lease agreements
pursuant to which the wells were constructed by the District and the
Partnerships' share of the water produced by the wells is used by the
District. Applicants claim to own twenty-five percent of the water
produced by these eight wells. Four of these wells were decreed to be
nontributary in Case No. W-6284-76 in this Court. The remaining four are
pending adjudication in Case No. W-9310-78 in this court.
10. An unspecified number of Arapahoe Formation wells are owned or
.claimed by members of Water in Our Wells. Some of such wells have been
decreed nor:tributary. Most of such wells are located several miles north
of the Highlands Ranch. The Willows Water District and the five Arapahoe
Formation wells within its boundaries lie between the Higniands Ranch and
most of the Wells owned or claimed oy members of Water in Our Wells.
11. Objector, Stonybrooke Associates, does not own any Arapahoe
Formation wells. Its interest in this proceeding is based on its pending
claims for conditional decrees for water in the Arapahoe Formation. Such
claims are included in the cases consolidated before a special water judge
in original proceeding 79SA38. (Southeastern Water Conservancy District,
et al. v. John Huston, et al.). The closest proposed location for an
Arapahoe Formation well claimed by Stonybrooke Associates is more tnan ten
miles from the Highlands Ranch.
I:. On November 5, 1979, applicant and objector, Willows Water
District, entered into a stipulation pursuant to which the district
Consented to a decree in this proceeding confirming applicant's right to
divert and use up to 6,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Arapahoe
Formation beneath the Highlands Ranch, subject to certain limitations and
conditions.
The Court's Memorandum of Decision, its orders entered on




in certain respects, to the terms of the stipulation; therefore, the
stipulation cannot entirely be implemented in the form in which it was
executed.
13. As indicated in the court's memorandum of Decision, based
on all of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that aPplicant
. has sustained its burden of showing that the pumping of its proposed
Arapahoe Formation wells will not affect the flow of the South Platte
River, Plum Creek, or any other surface stream within one hundred years.
Applicant's expert witness, Mr. Erker, expressed the opinion that the
pumping of applicant's proposed wells at an annual rate of 5,948 acre-feet
would not affect the flow of any surface stream within 100 years. His
opinion was based on data specific to the Arapahoe Formation in the area
of the Highlands Ranch. Such data included information available from
nine Arapahoe Formation wells that had been constructed on the Highlands
Ranch before applicant acquired it, and from five Laramie-Fox Hills wells
and four test holes constructed by applicant on or adjacent to the ranch.
Data available from other wells in the area and from published reports
about the Arapahoe Formation in the area were also relied on by Mr. Erker.
The Court also considered the evidence and opinions presented by other
expert witnesses who testified on the point.
The Court finds, based on all of the foregoing that it has been
established by clear and satisfactory evidence that pumping of the wells
at an annual rate of 4,915 acre-feet would not affect the flow of the
South Platte, Plum Creek, or any other surface stream within 100 years.
14. As indicated in the Court's Memorandum of Decision, based on
the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the Arapahoe Formatio::
' beneath the Highlands Ranch contains about 491,500 acre-feet of water that
is not considered to be appropriated by existing Arapahoe Formation wells
located on and adjacent to the ranch. Under the 100-year minimum life
provisions of S.B. 213, 4,915 acre-feet of water is available for withdrawaj.
by applicant's proposed wells annually. As indicated in the Court's
Memoradum of Decision, this amount is based on the following findings:
applicant's lands overlying the portion of the Arapahoe Formation which
is subject to its claims in this proceeding comprise about 21,612 acres;
the average saturated thickness of the formation beneath the Highlands





is fifteen percent; and about 4,000 acre-feet of water annually is con-
sidered to be appropriated from the Arapahoe Formation beneath the High-
lands Ranch by exiiting wells on and adjacent to the ranch.
15. Although the State Engineer's denial order indicated that
applicant's Arapahoe Formation well permit applications were denied in
part because the State Engineer was unable to find that there was
unappropriated water available in the amounts requested in the permits,
the State's testimony at trial was that the State Engineer's Office did
not question the amount of water claimed by applicants. The State's
testimony was that the permits were denied because the proposed wells
were located within an area in which water levels in existing Arapahoe .
Formation wells had declined one hundred feet or more, and the State
Engineer therefore was unable to find that the proposed wells would not
cause "material injury" to existing wells. The testimony at trial
indicated that the State Engineer's policy was to deny all permits for
nontributary wells outside of designated groundwater basins in areas of
the Laramie-Fox Rills, Arapahoe, and Dawson-Arkose Formations where water
levels in existing wells have declined one hundred feet or more. Such
areas within the geological structure known as the Denver Basin in Water
Division No. I are depicted on applicant's exhibit 26, a color-coded map
prepared by the State Engineer's Office. This policy was referred to
throughout the trial as the State's "critical area" policy. The critical
area policy appears to be that no further permits are issued for wells in
any area of the three affected formations in which water levels are
believed to have declined one hundred feet or more since water level data
became available.
16. The evidence indicates that the critical area policy was
formulated by the State Engineer some time late in 1977 or early 1978.
According to the state witnesses, there are no written rules, regulations, I
guidelines, or statement of policy explaining the critical area policy or
how it is applied. Several state witnesses testified that the State
Engineer's Office has never adopted any rules, regulations, or guidelines,
formal or informal, for evaluating nontributary well permit applications
or for determining what constitutes "material injury" within the meaning
of S.B. 213. There was testimony that no application for a well permit




policy was adopted. The evidence showed that no public hea rincs were held
on the question of adopting the policy, and no public notice regarding the
policy was given to landowners or well owners before the policy was
adopted.
17. The boundaries of the one hundred feet decline areas con-
sidered by the State to be "critical" were established without regard to
the rate of water level declines in those areas. The evidence showed that
the State established the boundaries of such areas based on information
indicating that water levels in existing wells had declined 100 feet or
more since data became available. In establishing the boundaries of the
critical areas, the State Engineer's Office relied on whatever information
was available. No water level measurements were made by personnel of the
State Engineer's Office. No test holes were constructed or utilized for
monitoring ourposes. The boundaries of the critical areas were established:
through interpolation and extrapolation based on available data.
The evidence showed, without disagreement, that even if no new
wells are constructed, the continued pumping of existing wells in existing
100 feet decline areas will cause water levels in such areas to continue
to decline and the boundaries of such areas to expand. The evidence also
showed that new wells outside the boundaries of such areas will accelerate
the rates of water level declines in wells inside the boundaries. The
evidence showed, without disagreement, that in confined aquifers under
artesian conditions such as the Arapahoe Formation, the pumping of each
well ultimately affects each other well; that water cannot be used without
declines in water levels in wells throughout the aquifer; and that each
new well accelerates to some extent the rate of such declines.
18. The evidence showed that based on the characteristics of the
Arapahoe Formation in the area of the Highlands Ranch, only about 0.5
percent of the total water in storage has been removed when the water
level has declined one hundred feet. This is depicted on applicant's
exhibit 21. The evidence also showed that the amount of water that can be
produced from the Arapahoe Formation in the area of the Highlands Ranch
while artesian conditions continue to exist represents about 3.4 percent
of the total water recoverable from storage in the formation, so that when
water levels in Arapahoe Formation wells in the area have declined to the






will remain in storage. This is also depicted in applicant's exhibit 21.
19. Applicant's proposed wells would not be located within the
boundaries of a designated ground water basin.
20. The evidence shows that applicant intends to use the Arapahoe
Formation water claimed herein primarily to furnish a water supply for a
municipal water system to serve applicant's proposed residential,
commercial, and industrial development on the Highlands Ranch. The
proposed uses of the water include municipal, domestic, industrial,
commercial, irrigation, stock watering and recreation. Applicant claims
the right to reuse, successively use, and otherwise dispose of such water
for such uses within the South Platte River drainage. The water would be
diverted for immediate use, for storage and subsequent use, for exchange
purposes and for augmentation purposes, including replacement of depletions
resulting from use of water from other sources.
21. The testimony, indicated that applicant's proposed development
on the Highlands Ranch will be constructed over approximately thirty to
thirty-five years. Rather than constructing all of the Arapahoe Formation
wells at once, applicant seeks confirmation of its right to construct the
wells as required to meet water demands as the development proceeds. For
these reasons, and because of the large expenditures required to construct
and equip the wells and to construct the water system, the Court finds
that all of the wells should be treated as part of an integrated single
water system for purposes of reasonable diligence requirements, to the
extent that such requirements apply to nontributary ground waters.
22. The appropriation date asserted for the conditional water
rights claimed herein from the Arapahoe Formation is January 31, 1978,
based on the filing of well permit applications for the thirteen wells
proposed to be constructed, and the surveying and staking of the site of
test hole number 1, which was constructed for the purpose of gaining
geological and hydrologic data about both the Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifer
and the Arapahoe Formation. The evidence presented at trial showed also
that applicant staked each of the proposed well sites and constructed a
number of additional test holes in order to gain more information about
the Arapahoe Formation in the area of the Highlands Ranch. The evidence
showed that applicant intends to appropriate the Arapahoe Formation water





demonstrated through overt acts on the land, and that applicants have
taken the requisite steps in order to be entitled to a conditional decree
for the water rights claimed herein.
23. The locations specified in the original application herein for
certain of applicant's proposed wells are required to be changed as a
result of the stipulation between applicant and Willows Water District.
Applicant proposed to relocate others in order to minimize potential
interference between wells and to more efficiently produce the 4,915 acre-
feet annually io which the Court has found applicant is entitled. Some of
the objectors argued that in order to give adequate notice to others who
are not parties to this proceeding the application must be republished
showing the new well locations. Objectors do not assert that their wells
will be affected by the relocations. Instead, they argue that other well
owners in the area who are not parties may be affected, and are entitled
to notice.
The original application in this case claimed 11,640 acre-feet
annually from the Arapahoe Formation. The amount has now been reduced to
4,915 acre-feet. The original application requested the right, without
limitation, to pump the total 11,640 acre-feet annually through any
combination of wells. Pursuant to the stipulation subsequently entered
between applicant and Willows Water District, overpumping of any well
would be limited to 125 percent of its permitted and decreed capacity. In
accordance with the Court's order On September 10, 1980, the pumping of
any single well would be further limited to an average of 110 percent
of such well's annual appropriation as determined herein, over any five
year period.
Evidence was taken on the question of republication at the hearing
on September 10, 1980. Applicant submitted three alternative sets of
proposed locations for the thirteen wells to be constructed. Comparisons
of the effects of pumping each of the proposed sets of well locations in
the amounts provided for herein with the effects of pumping of wells based
on the locations and amounts claimed in the original application herein,
are depicted on applicant's exhibits 53 through 61. Applicant's witness
testified that none of the relocations shown on applicant's exhibit 56
would result in moving any of the proposed wells closer to the nearest




the original application. His testimony further indicated that appli-
cant's exhibits 57 and 58 show that no owner of an existing Arapahoe
Formation well on or off of the Highlands Ranch, and no other owner of
land overlying the Arapahoe Formation would be potentially injured by the
pumping of applicant's proposed wells at the rate of 4,915 acre-feet
annually at the locations shown on applicant's exhibit 56 to any greater
extent than he would have been if the wells were constructed and operated
as proposed in the original application.
The Court finds, therefore, that the proposed relocations as shown
on applicant's exhibit 56 could not injure any well owner to a greater
extent than the wells in their original locations at the original amounts
claimed would have. The Court finds that adequate notice having been
given of the original application, additional notice is not now required
in order to make these changes. The adjusted locations are described in
paragraph 31 herein, and are shown on applicant's exhibit 56, which is
attached hereto as Appendix 2.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
24. As decided in the Court's Memorandum of Decision, this
Court has proper jurisdiction over this proceeding.
25. If it is shown that the pumping of proposed wells at the
requested rates would not affect the flow of any surface stream within
100 years, then the water is considered nontributary. District 10 Water 
Users Association v. Barnett,	 Colo.	 599 F.2d 894 (1979);
Ruiner v. Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40 (1975). If the pumping would affect the
flow of a stream within forty years, the water is considered tributary.
Hall v. Ruiner, 181 Colo. 130 (1973). The Supreme Court has reserved
ruling on whether wells that would affect a stream within more than
forty but less than one hundred years are to be considered tributary or
nontributary. District 10 Water Users Association v. Barnett, supra.
The Court has determined, based on all of the evidence, that the pumping
of applicant's proposed wells at the rate of 4,915 acrefeet annually will
not affect the flow of any surface stream within one hundred years.
Applicant therefore is entitled to a decree confirming that its proposed
Arapahoe Formation wells will produce water that is legally nontributary
to any surface stream.




water outside of a designated ground water basin, the provisions of 37-
90-137(4) c.R.s. 1973, ("S.B. 213") control in determining whether the
permits required for such wells shall be issued.
27. S.B. 213 was enacted in 1973 as in amendment to the 1965
Ground Water Management Act, which prior to that time did not distinguish
between wells having tributary and nontributary sources of supply outside
of designated basins. The 1965 Act required well permits for all wells
constructed thereafter outside of designated basins. Regarding the
Issuance of such permits, it provided in part:
If the state engineer finds that there
is unappropriated water available for
withdrawal by the proposed well and
that the vested water rights of others
will not be materially injured, and
can be substantiated by hydrological
and geological facts, he shall issue
a permit to construct a well, but not
otherwise...
27-90-137(2) C.R.S. 1973. S.B. 213, added in 1973, provides, in part:
In the issuance of a permit to con-
struct a well in ... (a nontributary
aquifer outside of a designated ground
water basin), the provisions of subsec-
tions (1) and (2) of this section
shall app ly, exceot that, in consider-
ing whether the permit shall be issued,
only that quantity of water underlying
the land owned by the applicant...
is considered to be unappropriated;
the minimum useful life of the aquifer
is one hundred years, assuming there
is no substantial artificial recharge
within said period; and no material
injury to vested water rights would
result from the issuance of said permit.
37-90-137(4), C.R.S. 1973. (Emphasis and language in brackets added.)
The principal question of law in this case is what the language
"no material injury to vested water rights" in S.B. 213 was intended to
mean. The material injury standard, as applied to water rights in
renewable tributary sources is dictated primarily by the priority system
-- senior rights shall not be diminished by junior rights. Black v. 
Ta y lor, 128 Colo. 449 (1953); Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320 (1968);
Colorado Sorincs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458 (1961). However, the doctrine
of prior appropriation was held inapplicable to nontributary groundwater
in Whitten v. Colt, 153 Colo. 157 (1963), and the difficulty of attempting
to apply a priority system to wells producing from the same nontributary
source was discussed in some detail there.





Water Resources Partnerships do not contend that a priority system per
at applies with respect to nontributary groundwater, but they take the
position that "material injury" in the context of this case is economic
injury caused by acceleration of water level declines in existing wells.
Their position concerning the amount of acceleration in declines which
constitutes material injury is unclear. The State's "critical area"
policy which was the basis of the denial of applicant's permits does not
appear to tolerate any acceleration in the rate water level declines once
one hundred feet of decline has occurred. These objectors argued in
their closing argument that an "economic injury" test should be applied,
which would require findings in every case as to the financial means of
the affected well owners.
The Court finds that regardless of the outcome of this case the
water levels in wells tapping the Arapahoe Aquifer will continue to
decline. This is an inescapable result of the fact that water in the
Arapahoe Formation is being "mined"; that is the water being removed
through wells is not being replaced. Only by ceasing all pumping of any
nature--and accordingly foregoing development of the large amount of
water which is held in the Arapahoe Aquifer--could this result be avoided;
however, pumping of the wells herein provided for will contribute to the
decline, and accordingly somewhat accelerate it. Thus the necessity of
rsdrilling wells of certain objectors, although probably inescapable in
any event, will materialize somewhat sooner as a result of this project.
As concluded in the Court's Memoradum of Decision, the two basic
Supreme Court decisions which govern this branch of the case are
Whitten v. Coit, sunra, and Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458,
336 P.2d 552 (1961). It appears to the Court that section 37-90-137(4)
recognizes the doctrine of Whitten v. Coit, supra, and is a determination
by the legislature that each landowner should have the benefit of the
volume of unappropriated nontributary groundwater underlying his own
land. He should not be compelled to forego the development of such
nontributary groundwaters underlying his lands for the benefit of others
who tap the same aquifer.
The Bender case established that the water level or artesian
head is not a part of the water right. Accordingly, any economic
injury occasioned by a decline in water levels or artesian head is not





37-90-137(4), C.R.s. 1973. This does not mean persons in the position of
members of objector Water in our Wells have no recourse. In an appro-
priate case they may have an action for damages as suggested in Sender suer.,
28. Applicant's proposed Arapahoe Formation wells, in the amounts
provided for herein, meet each of the requirements of S.B. 213. There-
fore, the State Engineer's denial of such permits was unjustified, and
applicant isentitled to issuance of such permits. Applicant is entitled
to a decree confirming its right to divert and use 4,915 acre-feet of
water from the Arapahoe Formation beneath the Highlands Ranch, subject to
the conditions and limitations provided herein.
29. The steps taken and work performed by applicant are sufficient
to meet the requirements fo- iti a-iation of the appropriation of the
conditional water rights claimed herein, and applicant is entitled to a
conditional decree confirming applicant's vested right to divert and use
groundwater in the amount of 4,915 acre-feet annually from the Arapahoe
Formation beneath the Highlands Ranch.
DECREE
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
30. The application herein, insofar as it relates to applicant's
claims, as modified herein, for water from the Arapahoe Formation, is
hereby granted, subject to the limitations provided for herein.
31. A conditional water right in the amount of 4,915 acre-feet of
water annually from the Arapahoe Formation underlying the Highlands
Ranch, with an appropriation date of January 31, 1978, for municipal,
domestic, industrial, commercial, irrigation, stock watering, recreation
and other beneficial uses within the South Platte River drainage, in-
cluding reuse and successive uses until such water is entirely consumed,
is hereby confirmed. Such water may be used through immediate application
to beneficial uses, for storage and subsequent application to beneficial
uses, for exchange purposes, for replacement of depletions, and for
augmentation purposes. Said water may be withdrawn through the following
wells to be constructed, with the annual appropriation for each well to






Rradahoe Well No. 1:
(a: Location:
( p ) Depth:
(c) Pumping rate:












(5) Aranahoe Well Nc. 5:
(a) Location:
In the Sw1/46w1/4 of
Section 12, Township 6
South, Range 68 West.
of the 6th P.M., at a
point 350 feet from the
South section line and
645 feet from the west
section line of said
Section 12.
1450 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the NW1/45E1/2 of
Section 14, Township 6
South, Range 68 West,
of the 6th P.m., at a
point 2035 feet from the
South section line and
2205 feet from the Last
section line of said
Section 14.
1485 feet.
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the NW1/451L1/2 of
Section 16, Township 6
South, Range 66 West of
the 6th P.M., at a point
2130 feet from the South
section line and 1685
fee: from the Last section
line of said Section 16.
1050 feet.
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the 5E1/45E1/2 of
Sectioh 10, Township 6
South, Range 6E West of
the 6th P.M., at a point
50 feet from the South
section line and 1165
feet from the Last section
line of said Section 10.
1275 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SEhNEi of
Section 23, Township
6 South, Range 68 West
of the 6th P.m., at a point
1910 feet from the North
section line and 11E5
feet from the East section























(10) Aratlahoe Well No. 10:
(a) Location:
1620 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the NEhNEh of
Section 22, Township 6,
South, Range 68 West of
• the 6th P.M., at a point
870 feet from the North
section line and 1215
feet from the East section
line.of said Section 22.
1375 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SANWh of
Section 25, Township 6
South, Range 68 West of
the 6th P.M., at a point
1365 feet from the North
section line and 770
feet from the West section
line of said Section 25.
1660 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SEhNEh of
Section 27, Township 6
South, Range 68 West, of
the 6th P.M., at a point
2255 feet from the North
section line and 20 feet
from the East section
line of said Section 27.
1375 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SWhSWIt of Section 30,
Township 6 South, Range 67
West of the 6th P.M., at
a point 1065 feet from the
South section line and 770
feet from the West section
line of said Section 30.
1850 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SPASEh of
Section 29, Township 6
South, Range 67 West of
the 6th P.M., at a point
1265 feet from the South
section line and 990
feet from the East section




















600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SWkNEk of
Section 35, Township 6
South, Range 68 West of
the 6th P.M., at a point
2480 feet from the North
section line and 2455
feet from the East section
line of said Section 35.
1480 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the SWkNEk of
Section 2, Township 7
South, Range 68 West of
.the 6th P.M., at a point
2600 feet from the North
section line and 1510
feet from the East section
line of said Section 2.
1450 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
In the NEkNEh of Section 1,
Township 7 South, Range 68
West of the 6th P.M., at
a point 225 feet from the
North section line and 400
feet from the East section
line of said Section 1.
1660 feet
600 g.p.m. (1.34 c.f.s.)
32. The conditional water rights confirmed herein are subject to
the following limitations:
(a) The total amount of water that may be produced from the
Arapahoe Formation beneath the Highlands Ranch through applicant's
proposed wells that are the subject of this proceeding shall be 4,915
acre-feet annually.
(b) The amount of water available for appropriation by each
well annually shall be determined by the Colorado Division of Water
Resources based on data obtained from construction of each well. In
P' making such determinations, the following method and criteria shall be
applied:
(1) The sand line and shale line on the spontaneous




in Schlumbereer Loc intereretation manual (1972). •
(2) Saturated sand thickness in the interval of interest
shall be defined as the cumulative thickness of that material for which
the spontaneous potential log falls on the sand side of the line midway
between the sand and shale lines. For wells where no spontaneous potential
log is available, the saturated thickness shall be considered to be
275 feet.
(3) For purposes of calculating the volume of water
available for appropriation by applicant's wells, the specific yield
of the Arapahoe Formation shall be fifteen percent.
(4) The volume of water available for appropriation
by each well annually shall be one percent of the product of the specific
yield of the aquifer, the saturated thickness of the aquifer at the
well site, and the surface land area within the "cylinder of appropriation"
for that well. The cylinder of appropriation for any well constructed
pursuant to this decree shall not overlap the cylinders of appropriation
of any nonexempt Arapahoe Formation wells owned by others and existing
on the date of this decree. A specific yield value of fifteen percent
shall be used in computing the surface land area on the Highlands Ranch
considered to be within the "cylinders of appropriation" of existing
nonexempt Arapahoe Formation wells, and tc detect:int spacing between
applicant's wells and existing wells owned by others. For the purposes
of this decree, "cylinder of appropriation" is defined as that vertical
cylindrical volume of the aquifer which contains the amount of water to
be , appropriated by the subject well over a 100-year period. The well
site is considered to be the center of the cylinder.
(5) Subject to the Court's retained jurisdiction to
resolve questions of spacing and proposed changes of well locations,
the locations and spacing of applicant's proposed wells shall be in
accordance with paragraph 3: herein and Appendix 2 attached hereto.
The annual appropriations listed on Appendix 2 are estimates only.
The actual annual appropriation for each well shall be determined in
accordance with this paragraph 32(b).
(c) The 4,915 acre-feet that may be diverted from
the Arapahoe Formation annually by applicant's wells may be diverted




annual appropriation of water by any such well shall not exceed 125
percent of the amount of water determined to be available for appropriation
by such well annually in accordance with the procedures set forth in
paragraph 32(b) hereof, and provided further that the average of the
annual appropriations of water from any such well over any five-year period
reckoned in a continuous progressive series beginning when water from
the well is first put to beneficial use, shall not exceed 110 percent
of the average of the amount of water annually determined to be available
for appropriation by such well in accordance with the procedures set
forth in paragraph 32(b) hereof, during such five year period. The
Court retains jurisdiction to resolve any disputes that may arise
concerning interference between applicant's wells and the eight existing
Arapahoe Formation wells on the Highlands Ranch that are now used by
the Willows Water District.
(d) If after the thirteen wells provided for herein
have been constructed applicant determines that additional wells are
fe--, necessary in order to produce, consistent with sound engineering principles
and practices 4,915 acre-feet of water annually, then applicant may
apply to this Court for permission to construct such additional well or
wells. Such applications shall be published as required by law and the
rules of this Court. Pursuant to C.R.S. 1973, 37-90-137(4), applicant
shall apply to the State Engineer for permits to construct such
additional wells. In considering such permit applications, the State
Engineer shall be governed by the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree herein.
(e) Each of the wells provided for herein shall be
constructed and operated in a manner consistent with sound engineering
principles and practices.
(f) Each of the wells provided for herein shall be
constructed and equipped in the following manner:
(1) A totalizing flow meter shall be installed
on the well discharge prior to diverting water for beneficial use.
Applicant shall keep records of such diversions for each individual
well and shall submit them to the Division of Water Resources upon request.
(2) Each well shall be equipped so that water





(3) The entire bore hole of each well shall be
geophysically surveyed and copies of the geophysical logs shall be
submitted to the Division of water Resources. Said geophysical surveys
shall be taken of the open bore hole whenever possible.
(4) The ground water production from each well
shall be limited to the Arapahoe Formation. Plain, unperforated casing,
shall be installed and properly sealed to prevent appropriation of
water from other zones.
33. The Court retains jurisdiction for the purposes set forth
in paragraphs 32(b)(5), 32(e) and, 32(d) herein. In addition the Court
retains jurisdiction for the purposes of resolving any disputes that may
arise between parties hereto concerning whether applicant's wells are
.constructed and operated in a manner consistent with sound engineering
principles and practices, and concerning whether, in determining the
annual appropriations for applicant's wells, the Colorado Division of
Water Resources has complied with paragraph 32(b) herein. The Court's
retained jurisdiction may be inVoked by written notice to the Court
requesting a hearing. Copies of such notice shall be served on. all
other parties by mailing a copy to each of them at their latest address
as given in the pleadings and, if different, to the latest address as
known to the party serving such notice: The Court's retained jurisdiction
may also be invoked in any other manner provided by law or the rules
of this Court.
34. Applicant's proposed Arapahoe Formation wells, in the
amounts provided herein, meet each of the requirements of 37-90-137(4),
C.R.S. 1973. Therefore, applicant is entitled to issuance of such
permits, subject to the limitations set forth herein. Water is available
for appropriation from the Arapahoe Formation beneath the Highlands
Ranch, and the withdrawal, through said thirteen wells to be constructed
of 4,915 acre-feet annually, will not result in material injury to any
other vested water rights.
35. The proposed withdrawals through applicant's Arapahoe
Formation wells will not affect the flow of the South Platte River,
Plum Creek, or any other surface streams within one hundred years, and
therefore are hereby decreed to be nontributary to any surface stream.






herein from the Arapahoe Formation shall be an alternate or supplemental
point of diversion for each other such well, and each well shall be
treated as part of an integrated single water system for purposes of
reasonable diligence requirements. Since the wells will be constructed
over a considerable period of time as development proceeds on the
Highlands Ranch, failure to construct any of said wells within the
period of time specified in the well permits for said wells shall not
necessarily affect future determinations to be made by this Court with
respect to such reasonable diligence requirements.
37. The Court hereby decrees and confirms that applicant is
entitled to construct the proposed wells to produce and use annually
4,915 acre-feet of water from the Arapahoe Formation beneath the
Highlands Ranch, subject to the limitations provided for herein, and
that applicant owns a vested right to divert and use such water. At
such time as applicant submits modified permit applications for its
proposed Arapahoe Formation wells, the State Engineer shall issue such .
permits subject only to the conditions and limitations provided for
herein. Applicant shall submit a modified permit application for each
well at such time as applicant is prepared to construct the well, and
need not construct the wells all at once. If any permit issued by the
State Engineer for construction of such a well should expire before the
well has been constructed and the water applied to beneficial use,
applicant shall apply to the State Engineer for the issuance of a new
well permit at the time applicant is prepared to construct the well.
_
The State Engineer shall thereupon issue a new well permit for the well
identical to the one that expired.
38. An application for a quadrennial finding of reasonable
diligeAte shall be filed during or before the month of December, 1984,
and during or before the month of December of every fourth calendar
year thereafter as long as applicant desires to maintain the condi-
tional water right decreed herein, or until determination shall have
been made that such conditional water right has become absolute by
reason of the completion of the appropriation.
DATED thisig7 day of February, 19ei7, 'Flat." lt."7" 13 il	 ',A W/ 17r
Pa'
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BY Cli CO RTczne et al. ․) n ; i . II re: :: : :',' C.:V.*. '1
CLERIC WATER C. 1 ,7, DN i
STATE OF COLORADO.
NONFAT A. BEURMAN
Wdh :r 	 un.
APPENDIX 1
LEUAL orr,cRirTion
The followine parcels or real property located in Tounchip
South. nonyc 67 west of the 6th P.M., County of Douglas,
State of Colorado:
All of Section 5;
The SC 1/4 and the South 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Section
.	 6;
All of section 7. except one square acre in the NW
corner of Section 7 conveyed to the Directors of
School District Number Nine;
All of Section 0, except the north 465 feet of the
East 300 feet of the NE 1/4 NC 1/4 NE 1/4 or said
Section 0 conveyed to Public service Company of Colora-
do by deed recorded in Book 172 at Page 12;
The North 1/2 and the NE 1/4 SE 1/4 of Section 17;
All of Section 18;
All of Section 19;
The west 1/2 of the NW 1/4, the SW 1/4 and the West 1/2
of the SE 1/4 of Section 20;
• The west 1/2 or Section 20 except that part conveyed
to Public Service Company of Colorado in deed recorded .
in book 167 at Page 251;
All of Section 29, except n parcel conveyed to Public
Service Company in Deed recorded In Book 167 at Page
251;
All of Section 30; and
The following parcel or real property located in Township
7 South. Range 67 West or the 6th P.M.. County of Douglas,
State of Colorado:
The west 1/2 and the NE 1/4 or Section G. except that




The follow ing parcel n or real reperty located in Twninhip
0 South, Range 6 g West of the 5th P.M., County of Douglas,
State Of Colorado;
All or Section 1;
'Al.]. or Section 2;
All of Section 3, except that portion deeded to Depart-
ment of Highways of the Siale of Colorado by deed
' recorded in nook 159 at roue 399 and re-recorded in
Book IGO at Page 217; and except a tract Conveyed an
Book 159 at Page 342, and tract conveyed in Book 176
at Page 133; and except tracts deeded to the Northern
Colorado Irrigation Co. in Book 30 at Page 129 and in
Book 93 at Page 64;
The SE 1/4 NE 1/1, he North 1/2 of the SE 1/4. Lhe
SE 1/4 SE 1/1 and the SW 1/4 of Section 4, exce p t a
strip of land 1320 iect long and 22 feet wide off the
Cast Side or the NE 1/4 of said SW 1/4 and a strip of
land 20 feet long and 22 feet wide off the East side of
the SE 1/4 of said SW 1/4 and adjoining the strip of
land last above described on the South;
The SE 1/4, the NW 1/4 SW 1/1, the SE 1/4 SW 1/4. the
NE 1/4 SW 1/4 of Section 5, and that part of the East
1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Section 5 described as follows:
Peginning at the NE corner of said Section $; thence
west 1130 feet, thence South 700 feet. thence South
5030 West 418 feet. thence South 20'30' West 300
reef.. thencn South 1671 feet, thence East 1571 feet.
thence North 2902 feet to the point of beginning;
except that part described in deed recorded in Book 101 •
at Page 90; and except that part described in deed
recorded in Book 163 at Page 423; and except that part
conveyed to the Department of Highways or the State of
Colorado in deed recorded in Book 159 at Page 397; and
except n strip 150 feet wide for Canal through the St
1/4 of said Section 5, as conveyed to Northern Colorado
Irrigation Co. by deed recorded in Rook N at Page 256,
and except for strip 100 feet wide for Canal through
the SW 1/4 and the NE 1/4 of said Section S on conveyed
in deed recorded in Rook N at Page 132, and except that
part lying within the right-of-way for U.S. Highway 95;
That part of the Pr 1/4 Sr 1/1 or Section 6 lyino east
of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RaiIroad right-of-





All nC hlie Eaet 1/2 of Se , ' I j on 7, except that part
conveyed to ;e:hool District 016 in Book 101 at Page
37n: and except that part conveyed to Douglas County
School District RE. 1, in Book 270 at Page 204 and
except that part conveyed to Northern Colorado Irrion-
time company for nighline Canal in Book H at Page 132;
,and except that part in Chatfield Reservoir Site as'
deeeribed in Declaration of Taking recorded April 24,
1970 in Book 201 at Page 303: and except that parcel
conveyed to Cauder Concrete Products Co. in Book 311 at
Page 11: and except that parl conveyed to the Santa Pc
Land Improvement Company in nook 38 at Page 477; and
except riqnt-of-way for the Denver and Rio Grande
Railroad Company and right-of-way for the Atchison.
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company: and except that
part conveyed by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad Company to the United Staten of America in
Book 270 at Page 407: and except part lying within
right-of-way for U.S. Highway 05c and except part
conveyed to Board' of County Commissioners for Road in
Book 106 at Page 75;
All of Section 8 except . a tract deneribed as follows:
'Starting at a point, point of beginning, which lies on
the North and South centerline of said Section 8, 100
feet South of the North 1/4 corner of said Section a,
thence South on centerline a distance -of 674 feet,
thence East 305 feet, thence North 430 feet. thence-
North 58°15' west 430 feet, more or less, to the point
of beginning; except a tract described in Declaration
of Taking for Chatfield DAM Project recorded in Book
• 201 at Page 303: and except that part lying within the
right-of-way for U.S. Highway 85;
All of Section 9;
All of Section 10;
All of Section 11. except that portion of the SC 1/4
Bv: /4 or said Section II. , more particularly described
as follows: Commencing at the SW .corner of said Section
Ii measure rant to A point 1509.5 feel_ distant: thence
North a distance of 20 feet to the point of Oe0inning;
thence North 6"0' Cast, a distance of 213.3 feel to a
point, thence East a distance of 219 feet to a point.
thence South 212 (cot to a point 20 feet north of the
South line of said Section 11; thence west 27$ feet to
the point of beginning;
All of Section 12;
G141
- All o: Section 13;
All of Section 14;
All o: Section 15;
All of Section 16;
The North 1/2 and the SE 1/4 of Section 17, except that
pant el the NW 1/1 lying westerly of the Easterly
right-of-way line of U.S. highway 06;
in, except that part within Chatfiold
Reserve:: Sit^ as described in Declaralion of Taking
recot:ded in nook 203 at Page 303: and exc 6 pt tract
deeded to Northern Colorado Irrigation Company in Book
K at Page 404;
All of Section 22;
All of Section 23;
All of Section 24;
All of Section 25;
All of Section 26;
All of Sect.lon 27;
All of Section 35;
All of Section 36; and
The following real real property locatnd in Township 7 •
Soutn, ;;ange 6e west of the 6th P.M., County of Douglas.
State of Colorado:
A:: of Section 1. except that portion described in
Boor. 1 at Page 00; .
The 7ast 1/2 and the East 1/2 of the went 1/2 of
Section 2. except that portion contained ia deed
recorded in Book 61 at Page OU;
The North 1/7 of the Northeast 1/1 of Snction 11,
except that portion contained in deed recorded in Book
GI at Page 80;
V•
The follo‘;ing parcel oi real property locatod in Township 6






• All of Section 13, except. !Nat part in ChM:field
Reservoir $1 LC “s described in the iniclarAtion of
• akIkng recorded April 24. 9'20 in Book 203 At Page
383: And except tract deeded to Northern colorado
IrriyatIon Company recorded In Book N at Page 132 and
Book 3 at Page 430.
All or the above Pock and Page references are to Lhe records
of the Clerk and Recorder or Douglas County, Colorado.
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